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1. Introduction 
After the Second World War European leaders were determined to prevent the advent of 
another Europe-wide war. For many, the solution would be to create a United States of 
Europe that would offer relief for the war-torn continent and guarantee a long existing 
peace. In the late 1940s and early 1950s this led to the establishment of several 
organisations that aimed at tying nations and national economies together. One of the 
first such organisations was the Council of Europe (CoE). 
Finland did not take part in the construction of European cooperation. Its efforts were 
targeted at recovering from the war and consolidating its status as a neutral country. 
During the 1940’ and early 1950s, Finland was trying to balance its politics and actions 
between Eastern and Western expectations. However, Soviet presence in Porkkala1 and 
the signing of the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance (YYA 
Treaty) 2 with the Soviet Union (USSR) in 1948 made the Finnish efforts futile. 
Therefore, Finland’s position remained problematic until the second half of the 1950s. 
During the Cold War, Finland was not able to take part in organisations that promoted 
European integration because they were not deemed to suit its policy of neutrality and 
participation in them would have caused problems with the USSR. However, because 
Finland’s economy was closely intertwined with the Western European countries’ 
economies, it deemed it necessary to maintain and actively develop its relations with 
organisations that aimed at furthering economic integration and cooperation. Therefore, 
these bodies became the priority of the Finnish policy towards European cooperation at 
the expense of other organisations. 
Although the CoE was not an integrationist organisation but aimed only at enhancing its 
member states’ cooperation, Finland adopted a careful attitude towards it. Therefore, 
even though Finland did follow the development of the CoE in the 1950s, cooperation 
between the two really began to develop only in the 1960s; and Finland did not accede 
to the CoE until at the very end of the Cold War in 1989.  
                                                 
1 From 1947 to 1956 the peninsula of Porkkala in southern Finland was leased to the USSR as a naval 
base. 
2 In Finnish: Sopimus ystävyydestä, yhteistoiminnasta ja keskinäisestä avunannosta. 
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Research of Finland’s integration to Western Europe during the Cold War has mainly 
concentrated on economic aspects of integration.3 In my thesis, I want to approach this 
field of study from another angle and concentrate on a subject that has attracted less 
interest: the evolution of Finland’s relationship with the Council of Europe. 
1.1. Research questions and relevance of the topic 
This thesis studies the development of Finland’s relations with the Council of Europe 
during the Cold War as it is portrayed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland’s 
(FM) internal documents. This study will answer the following questions: How did the 
Finnish attitude towards the Council develop, which issues influenced the changes that 
took place in these relations and what kind of arguments were used in the FM to either 
support or hinder the deepening of cooperation? I will also examine the forms of 
concrete cooperation that were established during the Cold War as this provides an idea 
of how intensive the cooperation was.  
My research period extends from 1963 to 1989. In 1963 Switzerland became a member 
of the Council and this made Finland the last neutral country and the last European state 
that fulfilled membership requirements to remain outside the organisation. The FM 
found itself in a position where it had to defend its decision not to join the Council and 
this forced the FM to formulate a policy towards the CoE. The end point of my research 
is 1989 when Finland acceded to the Council.  
During the Cold War, the fields of cooperation under the CoE’s mandate such as human 
rights, were not seen as of being of vital importance to Finland and, instead, its efforts 
were targeted at creating more cooperation with Western European economic 
organisations. Previous research on Finland’s position in European integration has 
concentrated on this same subject and, as a consequence, the Finnish relationship with 
European organisations that focused on economic integration or cooperation have been 
studied quite extensively. Also, there is plenty of research on Finland’s position in 
between the Cold War blocks and how it tried to adapt its foreign policy to meet the 
demands of this peculiar situation.  
However, research on Finland’s relationship with the CoE is almost non-existent and 
even though Finland’s accession to the organisation has been the subject of some 
                                                 
3 See for example: Aunesluoma, Juhana. Vapaakaupan tiellä: Suomen kauppa- ja integraatiopolitiikka 
maailmansodista EU-aikaan. Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura. 2011. 
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studies, the development of the relations and cooperation that took place during the 
Cold War has not attracted researchers’ interest. This thesis aims to fill this gap.  
The topic of my thesis adds another offshoot to the research on Finnish foreign policy 
during the Cold War. Study of the development of the Finnish attitude towards the 
Council is important because it complements our understanding of how Finland’s 
foreign policy was conducted and reveals how Finland formulated its position towards 
cooperation that was considered to be of secondary importance to it. By studying the 
Finnish foreign policy during the Cold War comprehensively our understanding on the 
motivation and outcomes of the Finnish actions became clearer. 
1.2. Sources and method of the thesis 
The sources of my thesis are the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland’s archive 
material on the Council of Europe from 1963 to 1989. This material consists mostly of 
correspondence and memorandums from Finnish embassies in the Council’s member 
states to the FM as well as from the FM’s officials’ documents sent to these embassies. 
It includes also the CoE’s recommendations and other documents. To my knowledge, 
this is the first time that this material is studied in its totality and therefore it offers an 
ideal starting point for my thesis. 
The amount of material varies from one decade to another. In the 1970s, the decreasing 
level of interest in the Council can be detected in the smaller amount of documents 
found in the archive compared to the 1960s and the 1980s when the CoE received more 
attention. In addition, the thematic classification of the material in the 1980s in itself 
reveals the topics that were of importance in the FM at the time; there are separate 
folders for, for example, the socialist states from 1986 to 1987 and PACE’s Committee 
on Relations with European Non-member States (CEN).4 
Focusing only on the FM’s point of view offers a somewhat limited view on the Finnish 
relation with the Council. However, because my thesis forms the basis for the study on 
these relations I did not deem it necessary to add, for example, interviews or newspaper 
articles to my source base. Also, the vast amount of material that can be found in the 
archives of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (UMA) supports my decision.  
                                                 
4 UMA. 13-0-EN-bd. 1982/6570. Euroopan neuvosto (EN) – sosialistiset maat 1986–1987; UMA. 13-0-
EN-bd. 1983/4637. EN / Ei-jäsenmaiden komitea. 
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One problematic element that needs to be taken into account when using sources from 
the Foreign Ministry’s archives is that some pieces of material potentially useful for my 
thesis might have been placed in files dedicated to material concerning individual 
embassies. Due to the nature of this research and the restrictions that it places, I did not 
have the opportunity to go through the files of all the embassies that were linked to the 
Council, and therefore it is possible that these files contain material that could have 
been used in this research.  
Another issue that must be kept in mind is that the amount and quality of material 
concerning the Council of Europe in the UMA can vary due to the individual 
ambassador’s and the embassy’s personnel’s interest towards the Council. Also, if other 
policy questions were considered to be more pressing, information that would normally 
have been distributed to the FM could be left unreported. However, the FM’s material 
offers an adequate source base for my thesis. 
Because my focus lies in how the cooperation between Finland and the Council has 
been described and discussed in the FM and how the archive material portrays this, I 
have taken interest in the Council’s actions only to the extent that they come up in the 
FM’s archive material. Consequently, I refer to material found in the Council’s archives 
only when I have deemed it necessary to complement the FM’s material or when they 
offer vital background information. The documents produced by the CoE include the 
parliamentary assembly’s (PACE) recommendations, resolutions and minutes of 
PACE’s and its committees’ meetings. They can be found online and are accessible to 
everyone.5 
This thesis uses the historical method and only qualitative methods are used. Therefore, 
the preceding discussion on my sources is of vital importance; the nature of the sources 
as well as the possibilities and problems that the use of these documents entail has been 
brought forward and taken into consideration while this thesis was conducted. My thesis 
falls into the category of political history and is of basic research of the topic. 
1.3. Previous research 
As was previously mentioned, Finland’s relationship with the CoE has not been widely 
studied. It is only briefly mentioned in most works that cover the Finnish position in 
                                                 
5 http://website-pace.net/en_GB/web/apce/documents  
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Europe during the Cold War or the Finnish integration history. However, perhaps even 
more surprising is the lack of research on the CoE in general. 
There are some master’s theses that have been written on Finland’s accession but which 
have not concentrated on the development of the relations during the Cold War. Johanna 
Salovaara has studied the accession in her thesis L'adhésion de la Finlande au sein du 
Conseil de l'Europe. Her work concentrates on the accession itself. The research was 
done in 1995 and, therefore due to the 25-year-long secrecy period of the documents, 
Salovaara was able to access the FM’s archive material only until 1969. Because I have 
access to material that covers the time period from 1963 to 1989, it is possible for me to 
create a more coherent overview of the development of the relations between the 
Council and Finland. Also, Salovaara does not exploit her material as thoroughly as she 
could have done.   
Jarno Mehtiö has approached this topic in his master’s thesis Erilaisia reittejä 
Strasbourgiin - Suomen ulkopoliittisen aseman ja toiminnan määrittely Suomen 
liittyessä Euroopan neuvostoon. This thesis was conducted in 2012. However, Mehtiö 
approaches the subject from a different angle than I: he creates an overview of how 
Finland’s actions in the field of foreign policy were described in the public discussion. 
He focuses on special topics that were brought up by the press in order to defend or 
oppose Finland’s decision to accede. Also, his work has a more theoretical approach as 
he creates a constructivist theoretical framework that can be used to study singular 
decisions and theirs effects on foreign policy. In addition, the sources that Mehtiö uses 
differ from the ones used in this thesis. He concentrates on articles from newspapers and 
other publications and does not refer to any of the archive material that I am using. I am 
also more interested in the change and development that took place in the cooperation 
during the Cold War. 
The works concentrating of the Council are surprisingly few, and often studies have 
been published by the CoE itself. However, Birte Wassenberg’s History of the Council 
of Europe (2013) and Martyn Bond’s Council of Europe: structure, history and issues 
in European politics (2011) provide information about the development of the Council. 
The Finnish position in the Cold War has been studied extensively and for example 
Jorma Kallenautio’s Suomi kylmä rauhan maailmassa (2005) and Jukka Tarkka’s 
Karhun kainalossa (2012) offer valuable background information. Juhana 
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Aunesluoma’s Vapaakaupan tiellä: Suomen kauppa- ja integraatiopolitiikka 
maailmansodista EU-aikaan has provided me with important information on Finland’s 
position in economic integration.  
These studies also bring up Finland’s membership in the Council and the arguments that 
were used to support accession in the late 1980s. Kallenautio and Aunesluoma provide 
us with concise accounts on the main themes that affected the Finnish decision to join in 
1989. They concentrate on a short time period that precedes accession and, therefore, 
their accounts do not provide us with a coherent image on Finland’s path to 
membership.6 Tarkka takes a deeper look in to the development of the relations as he 
brings forth the general policies on which Finland’s attitude towards the Council was 
based. However, the policies are only presented in his account and the reasons that led 
to the development of the policies is not covered.7 Thus, a more thorough study on the 
development of the relations is necessary.  
1.4. The Council of Europe 
After the Second World War, there were many groups and individuals who sought to 
form a new kind of Europe, a United States of Europe. The Congress of The Hague 
gathered together leaders, activists and representatives of the civil society who wanted 
to create a united Europe and formulate a model for peaceful coexistence in 1948. The 
idea for a Council of Europe was put forwards in the Congress’ final statement8 and the 
CoE was established by ten Western European states9 by the Treaty of London in May 
1949.  
The CoE’s organizational structure was created on an intergovernmental basis: The 
Council of Ministers (CM) guards the benefits of the member states’ governments and 
member states’ parliaments are represented in the Consultative Assembly10. The CM is 
the decision-making body of the Council and it consists of Minister’s for Foreign 
Affairs or their delegates. PACE is the preparatory, deliberative body of the Council and 
                                                 
6 Kallenautio, Jorma. Suomi kylmän rauhan maailmassa. Suomalaisen kirjallisuuden seura. Helsinki. 
2005. 462–465; Aunesluoma. 2011. 399–403. Aunesluoma bases his account mostly in Kallenautio’s 
study.  
7 Tarkka, Jukka. Karhun kainalossa. Suomen kylmä sota 1947–1990. Otava. Helsinki. 2012. 
8 Pinder, John. “The Beginning of the European Union” in A Companion to Europe since 1945. Ed. Klaus 
Larres. Wiley-Blackwell Publishing. Chichester. 2009. 25–44. 29–30. 
9 France, Great Britain, the Benelux, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Ireland and Italy 
10 The Consultative Assembly changed its name to Parliamentary Assembly in 1974. In this thesis it will 
be referred to as PACE. 
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it consists of member states’ parliamentarians. It does not have decision-making powers 
but it can give resolutions and recommendations to the CM. Another significant 
difference between the two organisations is that the CM meets behind closed doors and 
the only public document that it produces is a press communique of its decisions. 
PACE’s meetings and documents are open to all.11 
The aim of the Council was to create a more unified Europe built on its common 
heritage and ideals on democracy.12 All European countries were able to accede to the 
CoE as long as they accepted the principles of the rule law and guaranteed the 
realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms for every one under their 
jurisdiction.13 If a country did not wish to become a member of the Council, it could 
join as an observer, which granted it the possibility to take part in most of the Council’s 
work. During the Cold War, the Communist Eastern European Countries (CEEC) were 
not considered to fulfil these principles and therefore neither membership nor observer 
status were possible for them. This was one reason why the USSR considered the 
Council to be an embodiment of the Western bloc. During the first decades of its 
existence, the CEEC were hardly in contact with the CoE.14  
In the 1950s, the CoE tried to consolidate its place as the leading organisation in 
Europe. At first, it seemed quite successful and immediately after it had been 
established Turkey, Greece, Iceland and West Germany joined it.15 However, the 
Council’s goal became much more difficult to achieve in 1951 when the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC) was established. In 1957, the Six16 signed the treaties of 
Rome that deepened their cooperation as the European Economic Community (EEC) 
and European Atomic Energy Community were created.  
                                                 
11 Bond, Martyn. Council of Europe: structure, history and issues in European politics. Routledge. New 
York. 2011. 81–82., Räsänen, Ilkka. Euroopan neuvosto - Koko Euroopan Yhteistyötä. 
Ulkoasianministeriö. Helsinki. 1995. 20–25. 
12Article 1. a. Statute of the Council of Europe. London, 5.5.1949. 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680306052 Read on 
24.1.2016.  
13Article 1. b. Statute of the Council of Europe. London, 5.5.1949. 
http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/rms/0900001680306052 Read on 
24.1.2016.   
14 Wassenberg, Birte. History of the Council of Europe. Council of Europe Publishing. Strasbourg. 2013. 
62. 
15 Bond. 2011. 82. 
16 The Benelux, Italy, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. 
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Although the Council was not able to succeed in its original goal to become the 
European umbrella organisation in the 1950s, it established some of its most powerful 
tools during that decade: the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was 
signed in 1950 and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) was established in 
1954. The European Cultural Convention (CC) was signed in 1954, which would have a 
significant role in the post-Cold War work of the Council.17 These conventions laid 
down the groundwork for the Council’s role in promoting technical cooperation in 
Europe. 
The years from 1960 to the late 1980s were difficult for the Council. The EEC grew in 
size and gained more influence. As the Six eventually became the Eleven, the EEC 
countries’ impact became more significant in the Council as well. In addition, the 
Council had lost its original purpose to the Communities as they seemed to have taken 
its place as the promoter of European unification. These developments cast a shadow on 
the Council during these decades: what was the reason for its existence?18 
However, during the period from 1960 to 1980, the Council was able to agree on a 
number of conventions which significantly helped the development of European 
technical cooperation and created common methods of tackling problems in a variety of 
fields spreading from drug traffic to spectator violence. However, as Martyn Bond 
argues the issues that these conventions tackled were often quite insignificant and did 
not concentrate on big European-wide policies.19 Nevertheless, they laid common 
ground for European cooperation. 
Although the Council was overshadowed by other European organisations, by the 
beginning of the 1980s it had grown to consist of 22 member states and included all 
European democracies, except Finland.20 As the Cold War tension lessened during the 
second half of the decade and the Eastern European states started gradually to develop 
their relations with the CoE, Finland began to feel the need to reorganise its relationship 
with the Council.  
                                                 
17 Wassenberg. 2012. 67–68. On the ECHR and ECtHR, see Bond. 2011. 21–47.  
18 Bond. 2011. 94. 
19 Ibid. 102–103. 
20 Excluding the European microstates, Liechtenstein, San Marino and Monaco, of which the first 
mentioned would join before Finland. For a more thorough account on the Council’s history, see for 
example Wassenberg, 2013 and Bond, 2011. 
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The development of the Council’s cooperation with Eastern European countries and the 
USSR deserve to be studied more closely here. As I argue, Finland’s accession in 1989 
was firmly linked to the improvement of these relations and the fact that it seemed to be 
only a matter of time that a CEEC would be given an observer status in the CoE.  
Even though the CEEC were not able to access the Council this did not mean that the 
CoE was not trying to include them in its realm of action. However, during the 1950s 
the Council concentrated on defining its place among the European organisations and 
relations with the East did not receive much attention. Even if the Council would have 
been eager to further its cooperation with the East, it would not have been likely to 
succeed in its efforts. In the Eastern bloc the CoE was considered to be the civilian arm 
of NATO.21 This reputation derived from the composition of the Council as eight of the 
ten original CoE member states were also members of NATO. Therefore, for many 
years, cooperation with the Council was ruled out from the Eastern bloc’s point of view. 
For both sides, the unresolved German question also influenced their unwillingness to 
cooperate.22 
However, in the middle of the 1960s the CoE’s attitude towards the CEEC started to 
change and the Council took action. The Council’s own Ostpolitik was initiated by its 
Secretary General Peter Smithers who held the position from March 1964 to September 
1969.  His approach was based on three ideas: to keep these countries in touch with the 
CoE’s work; to encourage them to participate in the Council’s activities; and to liaise 
with their governments.23  
PACE took an active role in furthering Smithers’ ideas and during the latter part of the 
decade it issued many recommendations and resolutions to the CM that strove to 
strengthen the CoE’s role in détente.24 However, the CM adopted a more practical 
                                                 
21 Bond. 2011. 8. 
22 Relations between the two Germanys started to ameliorate in the middle of the 1960s, which influenced 
also the CoE’s ability to increase cooperation with the East. However, not even during the 1970 did the 
DDR partake in the Council’s work. Kramer, Mark. “The Soviet Block and the Cold War in Europe” in A 
Companion to Europe since 1945 ed. by Klaus Larres. Wiley-Blackwell Publishing. Chichester. 2009. 71. 
23 Wassenberg. 2013. 62–63. 
24 Examples on PACE’s activities: Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 389 (1964), adopted on 
23rd April 1964. http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-
EN.asp?fileid=14426&lang=EN&search=Mzg5fHR5cGVfc3RyX2VuOlJlY29tbWVuZGF0aW9u Read 
17.12.2015. & Parliamentary Assembly, Resolution 332 (1967). 
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-
EN.asp?fileid=15747&lang=EN&search=MzMyfHR5cGVfc3RyX2VuOlJlc29sdXRpb24=  Read 
17.12.2015. 
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approach and suggested that relations should be built on technical cooperation. It 
instructed Smithers to pay visits to some Eastern countries, which resulted in Smithers’ 
voyages to Warsaw and Budapest at the end of the decade. Still, results of these trips 
remained poor.25  
However, some development did take place: Starting from 1965 Yugoslavia began to 
take part in the CoE’s work by sending observers to many of its committees and at the 
beginning of the 1970s all the Eastern bloc’s countries, with the exception of Albania 
and DDR, had sent observers to the CoE’s committees, even the USSR.26 Cooperation 
had started. 
During the 1970s, the CoE did continue its efforts to build relations with the East but to 
a lesser extent than in the 1960s.27 In 1974, the CM noted that it should work to enhance 
the cooperation between the East and the West,28 but this did not lead to deeper 
cooperation with the socialist states. It is likely that the CoE relied on the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) to develop the East-West relations and 
believed that the CSCE would work for the fulfilment of human rights in the East. The 
Council was in favour of the conference and wanted to be involved in the process. 
PACE offered to be the parliamentary forum for CSCE discussion and wished that the 
CoE member states would go to the Conference with a single message. 29 However, its 
role was to be a bystander in this process which led also to the stagnation of its East-
West relations for some years.  
The development of the East-West relations slowed down even more in 1979 when the 
USSR invaded Afghanistan and the tension between the superpowers started to grow 
again. In 1982, the CoE’s Secretary General Franz Karasek went as far as to declare to 
                                                 
25 Wassenberg. 2013. 62–63. 
26 UMA. 7D 2 EN. Suomi ja Euroopan neuvosto. Jaakko Iloniemi. No 230/1976. P.M. Suomi ja Euroopan 
neuvosto 7.5.1976. 5. 
27 Wassenberg. 2013. 72. 
28 Resolution (74) 4 by the Council of Ministers, adopted on 24 of January 1974. 8. 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=164963&Site=CM&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntrane
t=EDB021&BackColorLogged=F5D383 Read 21.12.2015. 
29 PACE’s Resolution 588 (1975) om Security and  co-operation in Europe (General Policy of the Council 
of Europe) is a good example of this as it emphasises the importance and possibilities that CSCE process 
entail. http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-
EN.asp?fileid=16001&lang=EN&search=NTg4 Read on 21.12.2015. 
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PACE that the CoE’s possibilities to cooperate with the Eastern states have become 
uncertain for “an indefinite period of time” due to events in Afghanistan and Poland.30  
However, because the CoE was committed to the CSCE process, these relations never 
disappeared completely from the CoE’s agenda but the monitoring of the development 
took place within the discussions that were held on the CSCE.31 Direct comments on the 
CEEC concentrated on human rights violations which PACE dealt with in its sessions.32  
The relation started to improve again in 1984 when PACE adopted Resolution 826 
(1984) on East-West relations. It encouraged all member states  
“--- to intensify European co-operation in the various specialised fields of 
activity included within the general terms of reference of the Council of 
Europe, and particularly in the educational, cultural, economic, 
environmental, legal and scientific fields” 33  
Thus, the Resolution 826 opened the work of the CoE to the Eastern states once more. 
Another goal of the resolution was to gain more information on the USSR and the 
socialist states as it instructed the CoE’s committees to carry out a study on their human 
rights situation.34  
PACE’s efforts were backed up by the CM in 1985 when it adopted Resolution (85) 5 
on European cultural identity. It affirmed the member states’ belief on a common 
European heritage and identity that existed on both sides of the Iron Curtain. It was also 
                                                 
30 UMA. 13-0 EN-ba. 1982/4513. Euroopan neuvosto / yleistä. Heikki Puurunen. Euroopan neuvosto. 
22.4.1982. 6. 
31 The various recommendations and resolutions on the CSCE process, which at the same time comment 
the development of the CoE-East relations, are a proof of this. For example, Resolution 806 (1983) CSCE 
meeting in Madrid http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-
EN.asp?fileid=16217&lang=EN&search=ODA2fHR5cGVfc3RyX2VuOlJlc29sdXRpb24= Read on 
28.12.2015 & Resolution 759(1981) Madrid meeting of the CSCE (general policy of the Council of 
Europe) http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-
EN.asp?fileid=16170&lang=EN&search=NzU5fHR5cGVfc3RyX2VuOlJlc29sdXRpb24= Read on 
28.12.2015. 
32 Wassenberg. 2013. 78. 
33 Paragraph 16.8. PACE Resolution 826(1984), adopted 28 June, 1984. 
http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-DocDetails-
EN.asp?fileid=16237&lang=EN&search=ODI2fHR5cGVfc3RyX2VuOlJlc29sdXRpb24= Read on 
28.12.2015. 
34 Ibid. 
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decided that the East-West relation would be built on cultural rapprochement, and here 
the CC would have a role to play.35   
However, the pivotal moment for the improvement of the East-West relations took place 
in 1986 when PACE adopted Resolution 866 (986). In its paragraph 37 it 
“Calls on the governments of all those states participating in the CSCE 
process which do not yet have official relations with the Council of Europe 
to review their position in the interest of improved co-operation between 
East and West.”  
The Council had seldom been as frank as this about making itself accessible to the East: 
in principle, it invited the socialist states to start building close connections with it.36 
Another interesting observation that can be made about the Resolution 866 is the 
changed attitude on the CSCE process that the Resolution reflects: where the Resolution 
826 had still been overtly positive about the process, now the tone had changed:  
“[PACE] Expresses the hope that the Vienna meeting, following on the 
relatively positive results of the Stockholm Conference, will be able to 
restore the credibility of the CSCE process, which would be seriously 
shaken in the eyes of the citizens of the participating states if agreements 
continue to be disregarded and violated as they have been to date” 37 
It can be argued that PACE was willing to see the CoE take a more active role in the 
development of the East-West relations.  
All in all, in the latter part of the 1980s East-West encounters started to increase and 
from 1989 on, the Council was ready to welcome the Eastern states in its works. The 
improvement of these relations offered the CoE something it has long awaited: a 
purpose for its work.38 
                                                 
35 Huber. Denis. The council of Europe (1989–1999). A decade that made history. The Council of Europe. 
Strasbourg. 1999. 8. A good overview on the development of the CoE’s relations with the East after 1989 
see Huber.  
36 PACE Resolution 866(1986), adopted 25.9.1986. http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-
DocDetails-EN.asp?fileid=16277&lang=EN&search=ODY2fHR5cGVfc3RyX2VuOlJlc29sdXRpb24= 
Read on 28.12.2015. 
37 Article 36, Resolution 866. 
38 Huber. 1999. 8. 
13 
 
1.5. The general lines of the Finnish foreign policy during the Cold War 
Finland was not involved in the creation of the new Europe in the late 1940s and early 
1950s. After the Second World War, the most important question in the Finnish foreign 
policy was to stabilise relations with the USSR.39 The basis for the Finno-Soviet 
relations were laid down in the Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual 
Assistance, which was signed in 1948. It also defined the foundation for the Finnish 
policy of neutrality which would be the corner stone of Finland’s foreign policy 
throughout the Cold War.40  
In theory, the policy of neutrality defined the Finnish foreign policy after the end of the 
Continuation War. However, in practise the preconditions for basing foreign policy on 
neutrality were laid down only after Stalin’s death in 1953 and the return of Porkkala to 
Finland in 1956.41 In the late 1950s, Finland gained Soviet recognition for this policy 
because, at the time, the Soviets thought that neutral countries could act as bridge 
builders between the blocs. However, this attitude was not permanent and in the late 
1960s the Soviet view changed. As Kallenautio brings up, since the late 1960s, the 
USSR started to interpret the military articles of the YYA treaty in a different light than 
it had before and, also, it abandoned the view of neutrals as mediators: Finland’s 
neutrality would be acceptable only if it was pro-soviet and not targeted to finding a 
place for Finland in between the blocs.42 
During the 1970s, Finland aimed at maintaining its neutral status. However, as Juhani 
Suomi sums up, even though Finland had gained more leverage for its foreign policy 
and participated actively in Nordic and international cooperation,43 under the seemingly 
calm surface Finland struggled with the Soviet idea that the YYA was not the guarantee 
                                                 
39 There are many thorough accounts on the Finnish foreign policy during the Cold War, therefore this 
chapter only outlines the major policy developments that took place during the Cold War. See for 
example Kallenautio. 2005. and Tarkka. 2011.; Aunesluoma. 2011. 80. 
40 Kallenautio. 2005. 269. 284–286. There are many studies that take a very thorough look on the period 
in question. For a more detailed account on the Finnish position in the Cold War see for example: Tarkka. 
2012.; On the Finnish economic policy and action: Aunesluoma. 2011. 
41 Soikkanen, Timo. Presidentin ministeriö. Ulkoasianhallinto ja ulkopolitiikan hoito Kekkosen kaudella 
1956–1969. Karisto. Hämeenlinna. 2003. 33–35. 
42 Kallenautio. 2005. 267. 292–297.  
43 During the Cold War Finland gave significant value to Nordic cooperation and to the United Nations; 
for example Finland was a member of the UN’s Security Council in 1969 to 1970. More on these 
relations, see for example Kallenautio. 2005 and Tarkka. 2011. 
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for Finland’s neutrality but a military pact that tied Finland to the USSR.44 However, 
Finland was able to find a certain balance between the Eastern and Western 
expectations. In 1975, Finland received a long-awaited recognition for its role as the 
bridge builder between East and West when the CSCE’s final act was signed in 
Helsinki. However, the CSCE did not confirm Finland’s neutral status nor strengthen it 
as Finland had hoped it would. The USSR thought that Finland was trying to replace the 
YYA deal with the CSCE accords and in the West the initiative was seen to have 
originated from the USSR.45 
In the eyes of the Western bloc, Finland’s efforts to position itself among European 
neutral countries was at first quite successful and in the early 1960s the West had grown 
quite benevolent towards Finland’s policy of neutrality and was ready to associate it 
with the other neutrals.46 However, as the Soviet attitude towards neutral countries 
began to tighten in the late 1960s, the West reacted to this and an idea that Finnish 
neutrality was built on Soviet benevolence gained ground. At the same time, the first 
mentions of Finlandisation appeared on the discussion on the Finnish position. 
Finland’s position as a part of the neutral group was not entirely recognised until the 
very end of the Cold War.47 
Because Finland’s leeway in other policy areas towards the West was limited, economic 
relations were of significant importance for Finland.48 In addition to the fact that 
participation in economic organisations, such as the OECD and EFTA, was an 
important way for creating and maintaining contacts with the West, Finland could not 
even have afforded to remain outside these organisation because its economy was 
tightly tied to the western markets. Therefore, during the Cold War, one of the key 
elements of the Finnish foreign policy was to develop cooperation with European 
                                                 
44 Suomi, Juhani. Ulkopolitiikka ja ulkoasiainhallinto: kolikon kaksi puolta. Ulkoasianministeriö- 
Helsinki. 2001. 46. See also, Kallenautio. 212–213, 297. and Juhani Suomi. Lohen sukua, Urho 
Kekkonen. Otava. Helsinki. 2010. 631–641, 662–676. 
45 Tarkka. 2012. 234–236., Kallenautio. 2005. 391. On the pressure that the USSR placed on Finland 
concerning the CSCE see for example: Fischer, Thomas. “Ending the Cold War in Europe! ‘A mustard 
seed grew into a bushy tree’: The Finnish CSCE initiative of 5 May 1969” in Cold War History 
Vol. 9, No. 2. 2009. 177–201. 
46 This was partly due to President Kekkonen’s ”neutrality visits” that he did to, for example, France and 
Great-Britain. Suomi. 2001. 33.; Soikkanen. 2003. 230–231. 
47 Kallenautio. 298–299, 303. 
48 Aunesluoma. 2011. 80–89. More on the connection between foreign policy and trade policy, see 
Aunesluoma. 2011. 
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economic organisations.49 In regard to participation in the integrating Europe, relations 
with these organisations were considered to be a priority. As this thesis will 
demonstrate, this importance often outweighed the development of relations with the 
Council of Europe.  
Maybe the most significant change in the Finnish foreign policy during the Cold War 
took place in 1981. After his 25-year-long presidency, Urho Kekkonen stepped down in 
October 1981 and Mauno Koivisto replaced him first in the role of acting president and 
then in January 1982 he was elected president. Kekkonen had held the strings of foreign 
policy tightly in his hands, often bypassing the Minister for Foreign Affairs and relying 
on his personal contacts especially in matters concerning the USSR. After Kekkonen 
was elected for his third term in 1968 nobody questioned his authority as the leader of 
foreign policy, and he continued to enjoy this strong position until his resignation. The 
FM was also closely observed by Kekkonen and he followed closely and, if necessary, 
interfered in, the appointments of the FM’s officials.50  
After Kekkonen’s resignation, speculations on the continuity of the Finnish foreign 
policy arose, especially because foreign policy was not considered to be Koivisto’s 
strongest suit. However, on policy questions Koivisto was determined to stay on the 
path that Kekkonen and Paasikivi before him had laid down and the only thing that he 
wished to change was the method of how foreign policy was conducted. The method of 
how foreign policy was managed did indeed change and Koivisto, for example, gave the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs more leeway and included him in decision-making. He also 
cut off the Foreign Ministry’s officials direct contacts with the President.51 Koivisto was 
also successful in guaranteeing the continuation of Finland’s foreign policy. This was 
confirmed in 1983, at the latest, when the YYA deal was extended for 20 years in June 
1983, seven years before its expiration date.52  
If it was not Kekkonen’s retirement that changed the Finnish relations with the USSR, 
the change happened, nevertheless, due to a change in leadership. In 1985 Mikhail 
Gorbachev became the leader of the USSR and started his reformatory policies. 
                                                 
49  Penttilä, Risto E. J. Suomen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan muutos 1985–1992. in Suomen ulkosuhteet 
1990-luvun Euroopassa – talous ja turvallisuus. Ed. Petri Lempiäinen. Painatuskeskus Oy. Helsinki 
1994. 119–175. 122.; Aunesluoma. 2011. 
50 Soikkanen. 2003.48, 49–51; Soikkanen 2008. 17–19, 446.47–48. 
51 Koivisto, Mauno. Kaksi kautta 2, Historian tekijät. Kirjayhtymä. Helsinki. 1995. 24-25. See for 
example Tarkka. 2012. 429–430. & Soikkanen. 2008. 473. 
52 Suomi. 2001. 46. 
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Koivisto noted from early on that Gorbachev differed from the earlier Soviet leaders, 
and that, with him, a real dialogue could be achieved.53 Eventually, Gorbachev’s rise to 
power had a positive influence on the super power relations and the last détente of the 
Cold War started: The USSR and the USA conducted successful negotiations on nuclear 
weapons and the USSR retreated from Afghanistan. However, for Finland, the new 
leader and the new political situation meant that it found itself in a new situation and 
had to reposition itself towards the USSR. The familiar lines and policies that had been 
effective in the past and guaranteed a special position for Finland, and most of all for its 
commercial policy, with the USSR were not as effective as they had been in the past. 
The predictability of the Eastern bloc’s actions decreased.54  
During the first years of his presidency, Koivisto was not eager to promote new 
initiatives towards Europe or European integration. He maintained this careful approach 
throughout the 1980s and, as Tarkka has argued, Koivisto did not make decisions on 
memberships in EFTA or in the CoE but merely let accessions to these organisations 
happen when he thought that the time was right.55 However during the decade, Finland 
became more tightly intertwined in European cooperation: it joined EFTA in 1986, took 
an active role in the EUREKA56 project in 1985 and, finally in 1988, decision on the 
Council of Europe was also made.  
1.6. Structure of the thesis 
The first chapter has presented the context of this study as well as the sources that are 
used. The research problems have been brought to life and method has been stated. 
From here on the thesis is structured chronologically and proceeds from the 1960s to the 
1980s. 
The three following chapters contain the analysis. The second chapter studies the 
beginning of the relationship between the Council and Finland and how it evolved 
during the 1960s. The chapter focuses on Finnish actions but also the Council’s role as 
an active player in the development of cooperation is brought forward. The third chapter 
concentrates on the 1970s and continues to study the development of the relations. 
                                                 
53 Koivisto. 1995.173.  
54 Tarkka. 2012. 438–440. and Suomi. 2001. 50. 
55 Tarkka. 430. 
56 EUREKA was established in 1985 to further Europe’s competitive position towards the USA and Japan 
by developing its technology and offering possibilities to create Pan-European technology alliances. 
More on Efta and EUREKA, see for example, Aunesluoma, 2011. 384-391 and 394–395. 
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During the decade the Finnish policy towards the Council was reformulated and the 
reasons for this are studied in the chapter. The last analysis chapter, chapter four, takes a 
closer look into the 1980s and studies the Finnish road to accession and the evolutions 
that affected the Finnish decision to join in 1989. Support for accession starts to grow 
inside the FM as well as in other circles, and the reactions of the FM to this are studied.  
The fifth and the last chapter contains the research results and concludes the thesis. It 
summarises the most important arguments of the thesis and proposes further research 
possibilities.   
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2. Development of the cooperation in the 1960s 
The CoE’s position in the divided Europe and its efforts to increase its political role had 
an effect on Finland’s attitude towards the Council and during the 1950s the FM was 
not that interested in the Council’s work.57 Only in the 1960s, when the CoE’s role as a 
secondary actor in European integration had become a reality, did Finland start to 
cooperate with this organisation that the French president Charles de Gaulle called “that 
sleeping beauty in the banks of the Rhine”58.  
In the 1950s, a few contacts with the Council had been established. In the following 
decade, the FM decided that Finland could start to take part in the CoE’s work in areas 
that it deemed beneficial and which did not question the policy line that it formulated 
after the Swiss accession in May 1963. However, the FM was careful not to be 
intertwined in the Council’s organisation any more that it itself wished and, therefore, 
had to confront occasional inquiries about its status. Although the possibility of 
accession is not brought up directly during the decade, the FM followed the 
development of the organisation closely and a momentarily increase in Finland’s 
interest towards the CoE took place during the latter part of the decade. 
2.1. Relations are founded on the “Käytännöllisen yhteistyön linja” 
After Switzerland had acceded to the Council, the Council directed its interest towards 
Finland which was now the last neutral country as well as the only country that filled 
the membership requirements that stayed outside the CoE; Austria had decided to join 
already in 1956.59 The CoE started to explore the Finnish attitude and was eager to see it 
to either form closer ties with it or, better still, to accede. Yet, the FM was not ready to 
accede to the organisation that was deemed as an embodiment of the division in Europe. 
The Swiss accession started a new chapter in Finland’s relation with the CoE as the FM 
had to, for the first time, formulate a policy towards the organisation and found itself in 
defence of its decision to not become a member.  
The main points of the Finnish policy towards the CoE, the “Käytännöllisen yhteistyön 
linja”, or “the Line of practical cooperation”, were first introduced in early 1963 even 
                                                 
57 During the 1950s, PACE tried to increase its own role in the organisation and create the Council to the 
overseeing body over the other organisations established in Europe during the 1950s, particularly NATO, 
CSCE and the OEEC. Bond. 2011. 84. 
58 Huber. 1999. 3.  
59 Portugal and Spain were not considered democracies, Malta was not yet independent. 
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before the Swiss accession actually took place. After Switzerland became a member, the 
Finnish attitude towards the CoE had become a topic of interests among foreign 
representatives in Finland. The FM thought that embassies in the CoE member countries 
might face similar inquiries and it needed to provide them with a suitable answer. The 
policy was based on the idea that Finland could not join the Council or take part in its 
work as an observer because this would not have complied with the policy of 
neutrality.60   
Thus, in February 1963, the FM informed the embassies in Western Europe, Moscow 
and Washington about the pillars on which the Finnish policy was built: the fact that the 
CoE was still an object of superpower struggle and that membership was incompatible 
with Finland’s neutral status. Membership in the organisation would cause suspicion 
about the FM’s commitment to its policy of neutrality and, in addition, it was not certain 
how accession would have benefited Finland.61 So from very early on, it was clear to 
Finnish officials that membership was out of the question. 
Due to the Council’s activities later on in the same year, the FM was convinced that the 
policy needed to be more precisely defined. First, Finnish officials learned in October 
that the Council was considering to invite Finland to accede as a full member or as an 
observer.62 It was not in the FM’s interest to receive such a proposition because it 
thought that even an observer status would be interpreted as interference in the super 
power conflict by the USSR and the FM did not want the Soviet Union to think that 
something had changed in its foreign policy. In addition, the FM deemed that the gains 
that accession might bring would not counterbalance any problems with the Soviets, 
which further supported the decision to not join.63  
Secondly, in early November, during his visit to the Finnish embassy in Paris, the CoE’s 
Secretary General Lodovico Benvenuti wanted to express his contentment in the 
relations that were developing between the Council and Finland and he wished to see 
them evolve further. Benvenuti informed his host that the CoE did understand why 
membership would be problematic for Finland. Nevertheless, he wanted to point out the 
decisions that other neutral countries had taken and wanted to remind that an observer 
                                                 
60 UMA. 7D 2 EN. Europan neuvosto, Sveitsin jäsenyys ja Suomen suhtautuminen (liittymiskysymys) I. 
Max Jakobson. Ulkoasian tiedotus no 2. 15.2.1963, 1–2. 
61 Ibid. 1–2. 
62 Ibid. Oslo 10.10.1963.  
63 ibid. Max Jakobson. Muistio: Euroopan neuvosto ja Suomi. 1.11.1963. 1–2. 
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status would grant Finland access to PACE’s sessions and thus a chance to follow the 
CoE’s developments closely. To encourage the FM, he emphasised that the CoE did not 
have a supranational character and was a separate organisation with no links to NATO 
or the EEC.64  
These events combined, the FM considered it to be crucial to inform the CoE about 
Finland’s negative attitude towards any suggestions about membership well before the 
Council approached it with an invitation. Hence, the FM instructed the embassies in the 
Council member states to inform their host countries’ governments about the position 
that it had adopted. The final wording of the “Käytännöllisen yhteistyön linja” was 
based on the idea that neither membership nor an observer status was compatible with 
the Finnish policy of neutrality because the CoE was seen to be an object of the super 
power conflict. However, the Finnish government appreciated the work that the Council 
did and it would continue to take part in the CoE’s actions also in the future. This 
cooperation would be based on separate decisions on individual matters and would be 
extended to concern mostly technical fields of the CoE’s work, especially in cultural, 
social and juridical matters.65  
Thus, the main argument that was used to support the reserved attitude was the policy of 
neutrality.66 The USSR’s negative position had been brought up in earlier 
memorandums but was not mentioned in the letter sent to the embassies. The fact that 
the Soviet attitude played such a significant role in the formulation of the FM’s policy 
was never made public as it would not have complied with Finland’s neutral status. The 
FM had formulated a policy that would enable it to pick and choose the areas of the 
CoE’s actions that would benefit it in one way or another and would not cause any 
resentment in the USSR. This policy line would be followed until the middle of the 
1970s when the Finnish policy was reformulated. 
However, the reactions of some member states show that this position was not entirely 
accepted. Even though most countries were not surprised about the FM’s policy, the 
reactions in the Foreign Ministries in London and Vienna did not support the Finnish 
policy of neutrality. The British thought that seeing the Council as a target of 
                                                 
64 Ibid. Palmroth to Merikoski. Kirjelmä no. 279. 8.11.1963.  
65 Ibid. Jakobson. Ulkoasianministeriön tiedotus no 21. Suomen suhtautuminen Euroopan neuvostoon. 
21.11.1963. 1–2. 
66 Ibid. Jakobson. Muistio: Euroopan neuvosto ja Suomi. 1.11.1963. 1–2. & UMA. Jakobson. 15.2.1963. 
Attachment: Yrjö Väänänen P.M. Sveitsin jäsenyys ja Suomen suhtautuminen Euroopan neuvostoon. 
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superpower dispute was surprising, especially considering that Switzerland, that had not 
even joined the United Nations, was a member of the Council.67 In Vienna, the 
Austrians did not see the CoE to threaten its neutral status or the obligations that this 
status had created for them and, therefore, they had joined already in 1953.68 The CoE’s 
reaction was brought up by the Deputy Secretary General Polys Modinos when he met 
with Finland’s ambassador in Paris, Gunnar Palmroth. He said that the position was 
alike to what he had been expecting and that he understood the Finnish attitude. 
However, he reminded Palmroth on the attitude that other neutrals had adopted.69 
2.2. “Käytännöllisen yhteistyön linja” in practise 
Finland was able to transform the “Käytännöllisen yhteistyön linja” into reality 
reasonably well, and during the 1960s cooperation between Finland and the CoE 
intensified in some policy lines.  
The first step towards closer cooperation was taken as early as 1964 when the CM 
suggested that Finland could receive a “blanket authorisation”, which would give it free 
access to all of the CM’s Expert Committees70 that were open to non-member states. 
This kind of cooperation was already familiar to the FM, as it had sent observers to 
some committees already before.71 The “blanket authorisation” did not bind Finland to 
anything and was in line with the “Käytännöllisen yhteistyön linja” as it offered the FM 
a possibility to choose the suitable Committees it wished to accede and, therefore, the 
Government’s Foreign Affairs Committee (HUAV) approved the suggestion.72  
This decision can be said to have started a special relationship between the CoE and 
Finland which was based firstly on the FM’s selective policy concerning the CoE’s 
actions, and secondly on the Council’s continuous efforts to bring Finland closer to it 
and remind the FM on its existence and importance. The CoE’s eagerness to grant 
Finland access to its work formed a part of this relationship. 
                                                 
67 Ibid. Leo Tuominen. Kirjelmä 3587/949: Suomen suhtautuminen Euroopan neuvostoon. 29.11.1963. 
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69 Ibid. Palmroth. Kirjelmä 3009/1251. Suomen suhtautuminen Euroopan neuvostoon. 21.11.1963.  
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In the middle of the decade, another form of cooperation began when the FM decided 
that Finland could accede to the CoE’s conventions. The process commenced in 1965 
when the FM’s Political Department started studying if accession to conventions was 
politically desirable or even possible. The motivation for this kind of cooperation 
derived from the Nordic Countries’ active participation in the Council’s work.73 The 
FM feared that, due to its non-member status in the CoE and limited access to 
information, Finland would become a bystander in the Nordic cooperation. It was 
thought that accession to some of the CoE’s conventions could facilitate the enactment 
of Nordic legislation.74 
In November 1965, the FM decided that if necessary, Finland could join some 
conventions. This decision was justified by the technical nature of the conventions, the 
fact that they did not bind Finland to anything, the interests that a few conventions had 
already evoked among some occupational groups and actors75 and that they would be 
beneficial to Finland. The significance they entailed concerning Nordic cooperation was 
separately mentioned.76  
Even though the decision was taken in 1965, the first time conventions actually became 
topical was in 1968 when Finland sought to accede to conventions concerning TV 
broadcasts and veterans. What is surprising is that even though the CM had decided to 
invite Finland to join, accession did not happened.77  
The FM’s material does not specify why Finland did not join the conventions. I argue 
that the willingness to accede was linked to the decision to join the OECD in 1968 
which started a public discussion on Finland’s neutral status and how the Finnish non-
membership in the Council affected it. The FM understood that non-membership 
provided those who thought that the Finnish neutrality was of a “somewhat suspicious 
nature” with strong arguments.78 Therefore, I argue that for the FM the initiative to 
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accede to conventions was inspired by the idea that if it ratified some conventions this 
would prove to the sceptics that Finland could intensify cooperation with the Council. 
The momentary interest towards the conventions also supports the claim Ilkka Seppinen 
has made that during the late 1960s Finland was exploring the possibility to accede to 
the CoE as a full member or an observer.79 This argument will be discussed with more 
detail later in this thesis. 
As has been mentioned above, one significant enabler for the success of the 
“Käytännöllisen yhteistyön linja” was the CoE’s determination to keep Finland as close 
as possible to its work with the knowledge that it could not force it to become an 
observer or a member. It seems that the CoE officials believed that resilient 
communication with Finnish decision makers would at some point work, the FM would 
change its attitude and yield to membership.  
The Council chose to carry out regular inquiries about the FM’s attitude towards the 
organisation. Sometimes these inquiries originated from something Finland did that 
appeared to indicate a change in its position, but I argue that more often the CoE merely 
tried its luck. These instances were also used as means to inform the Finnish diplomats 
about something that might be of interest to the FM and possibly make it reconsider its 
attitude. 
One of the first such inquiries took place in October 1964 between Secretary General 
Peter Smithers and Gunnar Palmroth. During that discussion both parties said that they 
were happy with the current state of cooperation but Smithers wanted to know if there 
had been any changes in the Finnish position. He also wished to inform Palmroth that 
Finland would always be welcome, for example, to send observers to PACE’s sessions 
if it ever saw it useful. The meeting also revealed why the FM’s attitude towards 
observer status was so negative: Palmroth noted that this would be interpreted as the 
first step towards membership, since Switzerland and Austria had both proceeded like 
this before acceding. Smithers, in his turn, pointed out that Yugoslavia had sent 
observers to these sessions and no one was pressing it towards membership.80  
                                                 
79 Seppinen does not specify from where he has gotten this idea but, working with the Parliament’s 
history, he had a substantial amount of interviews and other material in his disposal. Seppinen, Ilkka. 
Ulkosuhteiden kirjo uudessa Euroopassa. in Kansainvälinen eduskunta – Suomen eduskunta 100 vuotta. 
Edita Prima Oy. Helsinki 2007. 389. 
80 UMA. 7D 2 EN. Europan neuvosto, Sveitsin jäsenyys ja Suomen suhtautuminen (liittymiskysymys) I. 
Palmroth. Kirjelmä 2401/995: Keskustelu 5.10.1964. Euroopan neuvoston pääsihteerin kanssa. 8.10.1964. 
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Again in 1967, Smithers wanted to know if the FM had changed its position and he 
expressed a wish that some development in the bilateral relations would take place 
within the two years that remained of his term as Secretary General. Smithers also 
informed E. J. Manner, a Consulting Official in the Paris embassy that the Council 
would agree to every Finnish demand relating to the development of cooperation. 
However, after this meeting, the Head of the Council’s Directorate of Legal Affairs 
Heribert Golsong told Manner that Smithers might be too optimistic in his views and 
that considering the Finnish “special status” they could proceed slowly with the 
development of cooperation.81 This is one of the rare moments when the Council did not 
seem to be unanimous in its attitude towards Finland. 
During the 1960s the Council sometimes held discussions on its relations with Finland, 
which the FM did not deem suitable at all. The first of such discussions took place after 
the Swiss accession and the FM’ reaction to it has been dealt with in the previous 
chapter. Another event that raised discontent in the FM took place in 1968. In 
December 1968, Ralph Enckell, then an ambassador in Stockholm, had learned from the 
Swedes that PACE’s Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries 
(CEN) would be discussing the CoE’s relations with Finland, Finland’s political 
situation and foreign policy in its meeting and, after that, it was planning on drafting a 
memorandum for PACE’s session.82 The Committee had carried out a similar study on 
Yugoslavia after it had shown interest in the Council’s work, and FM thought that this 
had inspired it to act on Finland as well.83 The Committee was one of the preparatory 
bodies under PACE and it was responsible for matters concerning eastern European 
states and therefore questions relating to them were often on its agenda. 
Because the FM did not want Finland to be associated with the East or give anyone the 
impression that it was willing to reassess its relations with the Council, it reacted 
instantly to stop the matter from reaching the Committee’s agenda and to prevent the 
study from being conducted. The embassies in Stockholm, London and Paris were 
instructed to take care of this and with the help of the Swedish members of the CEN, 
                                                 
81 Ibid, Manner. P.M. Keskusteluista Euroopan neuvoston oikeudellisen osaston päällikön tohtori 
Golsongin ja Neuvoston pääsihteerin Smithersin kanssa Strasbourgissa 23.2.1967. 27.2.1967. 
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they were successful and managed to remove the question from the Committees 
agenda.84  
2.3. Finland, the CoE and the CEEC 
During the Cold War, the CoE’s developing relations with the Eastern European 
communist states were of interest in the FM and the Council was keen to inform the 
Finns on the evolution that happened in these relations. One important element in the 
Council’s Ostpolitik was the role it gave to the neutral countries: they could act as 
bridge builders between the CoE and the East. Therefore, Finnish membership or 
observer status would have been a significant asset to the Council because it saw that 
Finland had a special relationship with the USSR and the East in general. 
The change in the CoE’s attitude towards the East in the 1960s did not trigger any 
significant discussion in the FM. However, it was aware of the development because the 
Council officials provided it with this information and in the latter part of the decade the 
Finns themselves were keen on finding out more on the state of these relations. The 
development that took place during the 1960s also influenced the FM’s decision to 
reformulate its policy towards the Council in the 1970s. 
The first of many instances85 when the CoE informed the FM about the development 
dates to Smithers’ visit to Palmroth in October 1964. Smithers told that the Eastern 
European countries had started to show greater interest towards the Council and that it 
would be very flexible towards them. Examples of such interest were the Bulgarian 
UNESCO representative’s visit to the CoE’ Secretary and that two CEECs had included 
some of the CoE’s treaties into their legislation. He referred especially to the USSR and 
told Palmroth that the Council did not consider there to be a juxtaposition between the 
CoE and the USSR even though it was unthinkable that the USSR would join the 
Council even in the future.86 
The CoE’s relationship with NATO was another point that Smithers hoped to clarify to 
Palmroth as he stressed that the Council could develop its relations with Eastern 
                                                 
84 Ibid. Enckell to Hyvärinen. Sähke 459/456, 14.12.1968.; Ibid. Enckell. 16.12.1968. 
85 For example, on the 11th of December 1964 (UMA. 7D 2 EN. Europan neuvosto, Sveitsin jäsenyys ja 
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European states much further that NATO could.87 The question of the CoE’s link to 
NATO does not come up frequently in the meetings between the Council and the FM’s 
representatives, nor is it discussed in other of the FM’s documents. However, the 
connection seems to have lived on in the background. As late as 1986 the Soviet Union 
wanted to clarify its attitude about the CoE-NATO relationship to the Finnish 
government and the soviet ambassador Sobolev told the Finnish Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Paavo Väyrynen that the Council often followed the policy lines laid down in 
NATO.88  
The East was topical again in May 1967 when Golson and Smithers pointed out that 
Soviet observers had taken part in one of the Council’s committees and that the 
Secretary General had just paid a visit to Poland.89 As this example shows, the 
development in East-CoE relations did not have to be significant in order for the 
Council to provide Finland with it. However, on one hand, this can indicate how much 
tension there was between the CoE and the East and on the other hand it reveals that 
even though the FM was trying to act as if the Soviet negative attitude towards the CoE 
did not have an effect on its position, the Council did not buy this. These pieces of 
information were always distributed in connection with enquiries about the possibility 
to intensify cooperation with Finland and were clearly targeted to affect the FM’s 
position. 
Although the FM was not prepared to secure Finland’s place among the Western 
democracies as a member of the Council, neither was it willing to see that Finland was 
associated with the Eastern European states. Whenever this nonetheless happened, the 
FM reacted quickly and reminded the CoE of its position. One of the instances when the 
FM thought, quite hastily, that Finland was in danger of being too closely associated 
with the East took place in 1964 and concerned the “blanket authorisation” deal. 
Sweden had informed the FM that the arrangement could be extended to include Spain 
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and some of the Eastern European countries too. Palmroth was sent to Strasbourg find 
out if this was true, but he was convinced by the Council officials that it would only 
apply to Finland, and that perhaps it would be for the best if Finland did not consult 
Sweden on the matter anymore.90  
Another example is found from early 1965. The Finns had learned that Smithers had 
confided to Austria’s Chancellor, in connection with the CoE opening relations 
eastwards, that Finland should already accede to the Council. He deemed this important 
because if the USSR would not react negatively to the Finnish membership, it would 
indicate that a possibility to establish closer ties with the East existed. The Paris 
embassy was instructed to remind Smithers that Finland had defined its approach to 
correspond with its own interests and that it did not wish to be linked to the discussion 
of the Council’s relations with the East.91 Smithers answered that he had talked about 
the positive effect that the presence of the neutral countries in the Council had on the 
eastern countries’ attitude towards it and that he would not in any circumstances relate 
Finland with the East when the matter of creating closer ties with the East was 
discussed.92 
The Finnish reactions seem quite fierce compared to the relative irrelevance of the issue. 
These reactions can be explained by the Finnish concerns about the viability of its 
policy of neutrality and how the non-membership in the Council reflected on it. Also, if 
Finland was dealt as one of the Eastern bloc countries this might mean that the special 
arrangements that had been granted to it could be expanded to the CEECs as well. This 
becomes apparent, for example, in the fact that it was important for the FM that the 
“blanket authorisation” arrangement was uniquely designed for it, and would remain 
that way until Finland acceded. If these arrangements were opened for others as well, 
this could, at some point, cause that an Eastern European country could suddenly be on 
the same level with Finland or even go further in its cooperation with the Council. This 
would, once and for all, derail Finland from its neutral policy line in the eyes of the CoE 
member states or certainly put it in doubt. This line of thinking was present in FM until 
Finland acceded to the Council in 1989.  
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Even though the FM did not show great interest towards the CoE’s relationship with the 
East, it wanted to be aware of the development of cooperation between the two and, 
therefore, did not rely only on the information provided by the Council. The FM 
conducted a study on European countries’ attitudes towards the CoE in 1967 and as part 
of this study it tried to find out more about the Council’s and its member states’ position 
on closer cooperation with the socialist states.93  
The study consisted of seven questions that were designed to provide Finland with a 
thorough view on the Council and how the Council would develop in the near future. 
Questions 3 and 4 of the enquiry were compiled to study the member states’ position 
towards the East. Over all, the answers to question 3, What is your host state’s 
approach towards the possibility of increased cooperation between the CoE and the 
East,94 indicated a rather positive attitude towards increasing the Council’s cooperation 
with the East in technical questions but, naturally, the CoE countries were of the 
opinion that for the CEEC membership was not possible. The Austrians expressed an 
opinion that Finland’s membership would signify a rapprochement between the Council 
and the East and could be the start of a favourable period in these relations.95 
The possibility of the Council to contribute to détente in Europe was measured by 
question 4: Can the CoE contribute to détente in Europe?96 The respondents saw that 
the Council’s work could have a positive effect on this at least indirectly if the attempts 
to increase cooperation between the East and the CoE were successful. However, here 
the deviation between answers is larger than in the previous question: the Netherlands 
did not believe the CoE to have any leverage here but then again the attitude of the 
Swedish answer emphasised this possibility.97  
As this inquiry indicates, Finland was not only in the receiving end when it came to 
information gathering but was also itself active towards the Council and took interest in 
the Council’s work.  
                                                 
93 More about this inquiry in the following chapter.  
94 3) Miten asemamaassanne suhtaudutaan yhteistoiminnan lisäämiseen Euroopan neuvoston ja Itä-
Euroopan välillä. UMA. 7D 2 EN. Europan neuvosto, Sveitsin jäsenyys ja Suomen suhtautuminen 
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2.4. The first bid for membership? 
The purpose of the aforementioned questionnaire was not only to study how the 
member states deemed that the Council’s relations with the East would develop. In the 
late 1960s the FM’s interest towards the CoE rose momentarily, and the aim of the 
questionnaire was to find out what most of the CoE member states98, Yugoslavia and 
the representatives of the EEC and EFTA thought of the Council’s future role in 
Europe. I argue that this questionnaire was conducted because the FM wanted to find 
out if further cooperation with the Council was necessary. The questionnaire consisted 
of the following seven questions:  
1. At the moment, what is the CoE’s most essential mission? 
2. What is the significance of the CoE in the development of the cooperation 
between the member states?  
3. What is your host state’s approach towards the possibility of increased 
cooperation between the CoE and the East? 
4. Can the CoE contribute to détente in Europe? 
5. What is the opinion of the far left about the CoE in your host state? 
6. Will the significance of the CoE increase or decrease in the foreseeable future? 
7. What is your host state’s take on the fact that Finland is not a member of the 
CoE?99 
 According to the answers, the most essential task of the CoE was to coordinate the 
European states’ cooperation in technical questions and, as the interviewees brought up, 
the Council had a role in enhancing member states’ cooperation mostly only in this 
field. As Finland already participated in this cooperation, the answers did not indicate a 
need for closer cooperation.100 
The question that most directly pointed out that the purpose of this inquiry was to find 
out if a need to reformulate the Finnish position towards the CoE existed was question 
number 6 that dealt with the Council’s role in the future. The countries, excluding the 
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Nordic countries’ and Austria’s positive view, linked the CoE’s future role directly to 
the resolution of the question of Britain’s membership in the EEC: if Britain would 
accede, the Council’s role would diminish. The EEC, however, saw that the Council’s 
importance would increase because the need for a neutral forum for discussion would 
continue to exist also in the future even if Britain was to join the EEC.101 These answers 
further confirmed that there was not a need for the FM to reformulate its policy.  
The last question is interesting since it enquires what the countries thought about the 
fact that Finland was not a member. Most of the countries would either have welcomed 
Finland as a member or did not have a specific opinion about the question. The British 
saw that the Finnish attitude was quite peculiar because the CoE did not touch upon 
defence matters but was rather a forum for discussion, and should, therefore, not be 
considered to threaten the Finnish policy of neutrality. The West-Germany’s opinion 
was that Finland would make its own decisions after it had weighted the benefits and 
negative effects of accession. However, a “high officer” from the Federal Foreign 
Office stated that he was under the impression that accession would not be worth the 
political concession it would require towards the USSR but if the USSR’s position was 
to change, they would gladly welcome Finland to the CoE.102 These answer reveal that 
the FM’s efforts to hide the USSR’s effect on its policy were not working. 
Even though the FM was quite cautious in its actions towards the Council and did not 
want to draw attention to the fact that it was not a member, the enquiry shows that it 
sometimes departed from this path. The motives to conduct this questionnaire are not 
specified in my sources, nor are the answers referred to at any later stage. The 
questionnaire was cut out for raising interest in the Council about the possibility that 
Finland was changing its course and would soon apply for membership and, most likely, 
the questionnaire also gave the Committee on Relations with European Non-member 
States the incentive to plan the study about Finland. However, in every occasion that the 
CoE officials asked if this enquiry indicated that Finland was considering to accede, 
they received an answer that the FM only wanted to update its information about the 
Council.103 
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This argument does not explain why the survey was so comprehensive and why the 
question about the member states’ opinion about the Finnish non-membership was 
included in the survey. Why the FM would have wanted to conduct such a survey, 
which, as it must have known, would certainly attract attention and cause speculations 
on the possibility of accession?  
I argue that the questionnaire was linked to the discussion about the Finnish OECD 
membership and the Council that began in 1967. As has been mentioned earlier, the 
OECD membership had caused a discussion in the public about the question of 
Finland’s membership in the Council.104 This was natural because there were many 
similarities between the Council and the OECD: When the OEEC was established in 
1948 it was perceived in the USSR as an embodiment of Western values but, similarly 
to what had happened with the Council, during the 1950s and 1960s its role changed 
and its controversial nature in the super power relations decreased.  Even if the straight 
economic impacts of the OECD membership were not significant, membership in this 
Western organisation placed Finland officially into closer cooperation with the other 
market economy countries and helped to create an image of a liberal Finland that was 
committed to the West. As Aunesluoma brings up, the process was a test to see how 
much leverage Finland had in the international arena. 105 Joining the OECD made the 
prevalent careful attitude towards the CoE seem unnecessary or at least overtly cautious. 
As the Finnish accession to the OECD produced almost no reaction among the Soviet 
leaders,106 it can be argued that, inspired by this success, Finland was studying if closer 
cooperation with the CoE would be beneficial since it seemed that the timing could 
have been favourable to this.  
The results of the information gathering did not yield any significant results that would 
have required a change in the Finnish position towards the Council. However, nor did 
they reveal any such information that indicated an increase in the Council’s political 
role or in any field that was considered sensitive in the FM. Therefore, the answers 
themselves would not have resulted in a complete abandonment of the plan to move 
closer to the CoE. However, not foreseeable in 1967, the year 1968 witnessed the 
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Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and the USSR started to tighten its grip on its 
satellites.107 Simultaneously a more pressing development started to emerge as the EEC 
decided that it was time to rearrange its relations with the EFTA countries.108 The EEC 
negotiations were too important to be risked109 and the plan to increase cooperation with 
CoE was put aside. 
Ilkka Seppinen argues in his study Kansainvälinen eduskunta that Finland seemed to be 
quite close to membership in the Council before the Warsaw Pact invaded 
Czechoslovakia and the Cold War relations generally deteriorated.110 From where he 
has gotten this information is not specified in the study but he has had a substantial 
amount of interviews and other material in his disposal. 
Does the FM’s archive material support this claim? The actions that Finland took in the 
late 1960s by showing great interest towards some conventions and the enquiry on 
member states’ vision about the CoE do point to this direction. We cannot say for 
certainty that membership was the final goal of these actions but in the light of the 
material it seems likely that Finland was indeed planning on moving closer to the 
Council in the late 1960s. However, because these plans did not yield any results and 
other issue became more important for the overall foreign policy, this interest did not 
continue in the 1970s.  
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3. Relations stagnate in the 1970s 
Relations between the CoE and Finland developed in the 1960s according to the 
“Käytännöllisen yhteistyön linja”. Due to the FM’s diminishing interest towards the 
Council, these relations did not develop as actively in the 1970s as they had done in the 
previous decade.  
The early years of the 1970s were significant to Finland’s integration efforts as it 
finally, in 1973, signed the free trade agreement with the EEC and, thus, secured its 
position in the economically integrating Europe. Focus on economic integration is 
reflected in the interest in the CoE and already the amount of material found in the 
FM’s archives for the 1970s is considerably smaller than for the previous decade. In 
addition to economic issues gaining more weight, the 1970s were marked by the 
preparation and follow-up meetings of the CSCE, which the FM thought would begin a 
new era in East-West relations. However, almost the opposite took place as the CSCE 
process brought forward the problematic question of human rights, which the newly 
elected US president Jimmy Carter also wanted to emphasise in his diplomacy towards 
the USSR. For the Soviets, this was an awkward subject, and this development had its 
effect on the stagnation of the Finno-CoE relationship as well.111 
However, even though the CoE received less attention than before, in the middle of the 
1970s Finland’s attitude and policy towards the Council were reformulated and for the 
first time accession was considered to be possible but not yet necessary in the FM. Also, 
some new forms of cooperation were introduced during the decade and at the latter part 
of it the first demands for accession were brought up. 
3.1. Forms of concrete cooperation 
As has been noted earlier, the decision that Finland could accede to the CoE’s 
conventions was made already in 1965 and accession to some conventions was 
discussed in 1968. However, it took nearly five years for Finland to accede to its first 
convention and in 1970 it signed the European Cultural Convention.  
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The initiative to join the CC came from the secretariat of the Cultural Convention in 
1968, and the CM extended an invitation to the FM in June 1969. From the Finnish 
point of view, the reason for accession was to establish cultural ties with European 
countries, which, excluding ties with France, did not exist. Joining the convention was 
considered to be the most straightforward manner to resolve this question as it saved 
time and effort in comparison to drawing up separate conventions with all of the 
member states.112 For the Council, Finland’s inclusion in this area of its work was an 
important event because when the Council’s Ostpolitik was first formulated in 1964 
cultural cooperation was placed at the centre of the development of its relations with the 
CEECs.113  
Although joining the CC signified increased contacts between the Council and Finland, 
the FM made it clear that this did not indicate a change in its attitude towards the 
Council and it would continue to develop cooperation with the CoE based on the 
“Käytännöllisen yhteistyön linja”.114 The FM referred to the fact that the Council for 
Cultural Cooperation (CCC) was a separate entity in itself, even though the secretariat 
of the CoE’s Cultural department acted as its secretary. Therefore, accession did not 
mean that the Finnish attitude had changed.115  
During the 1970s, Finland acceded also to the European Convention on Extradition in 
1971 and the European Convention for the Protection of Animals during International 
Transport in 1975.116 The conventions are a prime example of the attitude that the FM 
had defined in ”Käytännöllisen yhteistyön linja” and followed during the 1960s and 
early 1970s in its relations with the Council: the conventions were deemed beneficial to 
and would ease the FM’s work in other fields as well without questioning the policy of 
neutrality.  
In addition to joining conventions, Finland was also quite actively involved in the 
CoE’s juridical work and it sent observers to the European Committee on Legal 
Cooperation. During the decade, Finland also took part in various other fields of the 
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CoE’s activities and was particularly active in social questions and environmental 
protection.117 This cooperation was important also in the sense that contacts between the 
Council’s and Finnish officials continued to grow and more and more people became 
familiar with the CoE’s work. In the late 1970s and especially in the 1980s these 
connections contributed to the increasing demands for accession that arose in different 
areas of society. 
Finland sent an “official observer” to PACE’s session from the Paris embassy for the 
first time in 1970.118 PACE warmly welcomed Finnish presence and when the FM did 
not send anyone to PACE’s celebratory session in 1974 this was noted in the Council. 
The session celebrated PACE’s 25th anniversary and representatives from Yugoslavia 
and Poland were present. In addition, Comecon’s Secretary General had sent a 
congratulatory note for PACE, and these circumstances made the absence of Finland’s 
representative even more noteworthy. Ambassador Klaus A. Sahlgren from Geneva 
informed the FM that the absence had aroused questions in the diplomatic circle and, in 
order to be able to answer these inquiries he wanted to know if this indicated a hardened 
attitude towards the CoE.119  
During the late 1970s, demands for Finland’s accession started to surface, although not 
yet from the FM. In 1977, the Chief Secretary of the Ministry of the Interior Arno 
Hannus pointed out that until the late 1970s absence from the organisation had been 
somewhat acceptable because neither Portugal nor Spain were members. However, now 
when both had either already acceded or were going to do so, Finland occupied a very 
lonely position in Western Europe. He argued that although Finland sent observers to 
the Council’s committees and Finnish participants were always treated with respect, this 
status hindered its participation in some forms of the CoE’s activities. Also, Finland 
could not really affect the Council’s work or direction to which it was developing. 
Hannus thought that Finland should also contribute to the Council’s activities 
financially because, for a developed country, participation in the Council’s work for free 
was embarrassing. He was also tired of answering questions on why Finland was not a 
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member with weak explanations and, therefore, wished that action would be taken 
soon.120 The FM did not react to Hannus’ demand. 
3.2. CoE’s role in the cooperation 
During the 1970s, the Council’s efforts to get Finland into closer cooperation with it 
continued but the inquiries on the Finnish position disappeared almost completely. The 
Council’s view on Finland was in general very polite and it was willing to give Finland 
access to all of its actions that the FM considered to be interesting.121 This attitude 
continued throughout the decade. 
Although Finland was not on the CoE’s agenda as often as before, during the 1970s the 
Finnish non-membership came up in the Council’s discussion or it was questioned by 
individual member states from time to time. For example, when Lichtenstein acceded in 
November 1978 the Secretary General Kahn-Ackermann brought the Finnish position 
up in his speech: “We have now caught all the democratic countries in Europe with one 
exception and that exception is Finland, a country eminently qualified for membership. 
That country is still outside.”122 In 1977 the Swiss State Secretary wondered why 
Finland had decided to remain outside of the CoE, especially when Portugal and Spain 
would soon accede.123 During the 1960s notes like these would have been commented 
by the FM but in the 1970s they did not bring on any reaction; in the aftermath of the 
CSCE success it seems that reaction was not deemed necessary. 
Most of the time, it was Finland that tried to gain from the CoE’s work but there were 
also times when the Council officials tried to use Finland’s position to their own 
advantage. In early 1970s, the Secretary General Toncic was eager to enlarge the CoE 
and he saw that this would take place by including Finland and Spain more tightly into 
the CoE’s sphere of action and by creating closer contacts also with Yugoslavia. In 
relation to his plan, Toncic had suggested in 1972 that Finland could appoint members 
of staff to the Council’s Cultural secretary. However, he had a hidden-agenda behind his 
suggestion as Golsong confirmed to Paavo Keisalo: if the Council would agree to 
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include Finnish as members of staff, then the door would be open to Spain as well, and 
afterwards to Yugoslavia. Keisalo had directly informed the CoE’s officials that Finland 
would not offer anyone to this task.124  
As the previous two chapters show, the relationship between the Council and Finland 
did stay alive in the 1970s as well but they did not develop to the same extent as in the 
1960s. However, as was noted earlier, the continuation of these relations and their 
development in some technical fields, did increase the number of Finnish officials and 
parliamentarians that took part in the CoE’s work and were familiar with it. In the 1980s 
this contributed to the growing acceptance of the Finnish membership in Finland.  
3.3. Formulation of the new policy towards the CoE  
Although the development of cooperation between the CoE and Finland slowed down in 
the 1970s, the FM deemed it necessary to redefine its policy towards the Council in the 
middle of the decade.  
The need for a report on Finland’s cooperation with the CoE and a reformulation of the 
Finnish policy was brought up by the Deputy Director General of the FM’s Political 
Department Klaus Törnudd in January 1975 in his letter to Ambassador Ralph Enckell 
in Paris. Törnudd’s interest towards the CoE had been awakened by a meeting with 
Serenius, a researcher from the University of Turku, who had paid a study visit to 
Strasbourg and interviewed members of the Council’s secretariat.125  
During Serenius’ meetings, members of the secretariat had remarked that Finland took 
part in around 60 per cent of the Council’s activities and it was a member of the OECD, 
which on Serenius’ account was described to be a “more bourgeois” organisation than 
the CoE. Therefore, the fact that Finland was not a member of the CoE had caused some 
confusion among the Council officials. In addition, Serenius had received PACE’s 
report126 that stated: “Le Conseil de l’Europe est la seule organisation où se retrouvent 
tous les États démocratique d’Europe à l’exception – pour les raisons bien connues – la 
                                                 
124 Ibid. Paavo Keisalo No R-20/7. P.M. Euroopan neuvoston pääsihteeri Toncic-Sorinjin ehdotus 
suomalaisten rekrytoinnista sihteeristön kulttuuriosastoon. 2.2.1971.  
125 Ibid. Törnudd to Enckell. 27.1.1975. 
126 Report 3387. Adopted on 14.1.1974. Rapport sur la coopération politique entre les États de l’Europe 
de l’Ouest. Political cooperation between the states of Western Europe (General policy of the Council of 
Europe). 
38 
 
Finlande.”127 The remark “les raisons bien connues” was interpreted by Törnudd to 
mean that the prevalent idea inside the Council was that Finland had not joined the 
Council because the USSR had forbidden it to do so and not, as he claimed the reason to 
be in reality, because Finland had itself deemed the non-membership to suit its 
objectives better.128  
In order to correct these faux assumptions, Törnudd recommended that, during his first 
visit Strasbourg, Enckell should provide the Secretariat with the correct information on 
Finland’s policy and attitude towards the CoE. In addition, the FM would conduct a 
profound political evaluation on the Council. Törnudd did not see what concrete 
consequences this evaluation could bring forth since, as he remarked, discussion on the 
Finnish membership would be of a purely academic nature. Nevertheless, he started to 
go through the necessary changes that would have to take place in the CoE before 
Finland could even start to consider membership or observer status.129  
The first condition concerned the CoE’s actions towards Eastern Europe, which should 
not be openly hostile towards them, in other words the Council should not portray itself 
as a part of the ongoing Cold War confrontation. The second question that needed to be 
resolved was the discrimination of certain parties (communists) that had not been 
welcome to take part in PACE’s work. However, as Törnudd himself brought up, there 
had already been some significant developments concerning both matters and, for 
example, the Polish already had a representation in Strasbourg. In addition, as Törnudd 
stated, the CoE’s attitude towards communist parliamentarians’ participation was likely 
to change soon because the European Parliament already welcomed them.130 
However, even though these demands were met, it would be a completely different 
matter if these developments would suffice. Törnudd also listed other possible factors 
that would hinder accession: the Finnish Parliament had not shown interest towards the 
CoE; the CoE was considered to be quite an insignificant organisation in European 
cooperation; the reinforcement of the EEC would diminish the CoE’s role; and Pan-
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European cooperation was developing within the CSCE framework.131 What additional 
benefits could the Council provide Finland? 
The ideas in Törnudd’s letter led to a political evaluation that was conducted during 
1975 and the report that redefined Finnish policy towards the CoE was written in 1976. 
It studied extensively the CoE’s history and work as well as its relations with the East. It 
came to a conclusion that the Council could not anymore be considered to have a role in 
the super power conflict but, even so, accession or an observer status were not in the 
Finnish interest at the moment. The Finnish non-membership was argued for with the 
same reasons that Törnudd had already brought up in his letter to Enckell.132 
One of the most important and far-reaching claims that Törnudd and the report made 
was related to the Parliament. The report stated that further cooperation with the CoE 
would, most of all, signify an increase in the Parliament’s foreign policy relations, and, 
thus, in its work load. Therefore, if Finland was to seek membership in the organisation, 
at least the main political parties should unanimously support the endeavour. Also, if 
Finland was ever to accede to the Council, the whole Parliament should unanimously 
support the accession, as had happened when Finland joined the Nordic Council in 
1955.133 The socialist Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL)134 had won 40 seats 
in the Parliament in the elections in 1975 and, thus, was the second largest party in the 
country. SKDL was against of Finland becoming affiliated with western 
organisations135 and, therefore, it was quite clear that the kind of unanimity the FM 
placed as a prerequisite for accession was not to likely to be  achieved in the near future; 
and the FM knew this.  
The CSCE process, the success of its third stage and the signing of Helsinki Accords in 
1975 were reflected in the conclusion of the report. It emphasised the role that the 
CSCE process would have in the development of the East-West relations and, therefore, 
there was no need for Finland to accede to the Council. Finland could consider acceding 
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or becoming an observer if, in the years to come, Finland’s membership would 
significantly improve the Council’s possibilities to take part in the development of the 
Pan-European cooperation.136  
The development and amelioration of the CoE-East relationship composed a significant 
part of the report and was one of the defining factors of the new approach. As has been 
noted above, the 3rd article of the Council’s Statute prevented the Communist states’ 
membership in the Council. The memorandum deemed that the change in the CoE’s 
attitude towards the East, which had begun already in 1964, indicated that this could 
soon change. Especially Yugoslavia’s deepening relationship with the Council and 
reciprocal visits that had taken place between the CoE and Yugoslavia in 1975 were 
seen to signify this development. The report noted that during his visit to Yugoslavia, 
the Assembly’s president Guiseppe Vedovato had stated that the CoE thrives to erase 
the superficial division and will promote intergovernmental cooperation in Europe 
regardless of countries social systems.137  
The FM interpreted this to indicate that the Statute’s 3rd article could soon became 
obsolete. This would mean that in the future the decision on a country’s eligibility for 
membership would be taken by the member states and the Statute would not 
automatically exclude some countries.138 If this development would take place, it could 
mean that Eastern European countries could be eligible for membership. In order to 
prevent that a communist country would accede before it did, Finland had to reposition 
itself and its attitude towards membership before this happen.  
Even if there still were reasons for not joining the Council, for the first time, accession 
was not considered to be politically impossible. The report also showed that an 
evaluation of the Council was due and it provided the FM’s officials with up-to-date 
information on the Council and its work. In his letter Törnudd had based his evaluation 
on incorrect information: communists had participated in CoE’s work since 1972 and 
development in the East-West cooperation had started already in 1964.139 
In short, the FM did not consider there to be any obstacles as such for Finland to join 
the Council because the CoE was no longer seen to be a source of dispute for the super 
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powers. However, neither was membership considered necessary because the CSCE 
would be the body within which development in the Pan-European relations would take 
place. Also, as the questionnaire had shown in the late 1960s, Finland already took part 
in most of the COE’s work. Thus, Council did not bring anything new to the table. 
However, during the years, the reason that would be used most often as an excuse for 
Finland remaining outside the CoE was the requirement for a unanimous Parliament.  
3.4. Parliament’s role and inclusion into the discussion 
The first connections between the Finnish Parliament and the Council had been 
established already in the early 1960s when some Finnish parliamentarians had been 
invited to take part in PACE’s sessions. However, as the FM stressed at the time, they 
participated in PACE’s session as members of their parties, not as Finnish 
parliamentarians.140  
More formal relations began in 1968 when Finnish parliamentarians started to take part 
in EFTA parliamentarians’ meetings. These meetings were held in Strasbourg 
simultaneously with PACE’s sessions because many of the EFTA parliamentarians 
were also members of PACE. This opened up a possibility for Finnish participants to 
take part in PACE’s sessions as well, and it was decided that they would follow the 
sessions as observers. When the EFTA meetings were moved to Vienna in 1974 this 
practise ended.141  
The deepening cooperation led to the drafting of the first petitionary motion for 
Finland’s accession in 1970 by Carl Olof Tallgren from the Swedish People’s Party of 
Finland (RKP). The arguments that Tallgren used to support his petition were Finland’s 
extensive participation in the CoE’s work and the fact that all EFTA members, except 
for Portugal, were members of the Council and, therefore, the CoE discussed matters 
concerning EFTA quite often.142 As the petition did not yield any results, it was not 
discussed in the FM when it was made but was given as example of the Parliament’s 
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activity towards the Council when the new policy was formulated.143 Tallgren’s 
argument is also an interesting period piece: he does not bring up the Council’s work on 
human rights or cultural cooperation but justifies his motion with the discussion on 
economic matters that were not the Council’s core activity but reflected the questions 
that were topical in the Finnish discussion on European cooperation. 
Even if the Parliament’s participation in the CoE’s work remained somewhat limited, 
parliamentarians were still able to create some confusion about the Finnish position. In 
1970 the CoE’s Deputy Secretary General Sforza told Seppo Pietinen, that Secretary 
General Toncic he had been informed by a parliamentarian, either Ingvar S. Melin or 
Erkki Tuomioja he could not remember which one, that Finland had adopted a new 
attitude towards the Council and was prepared to aggressively expand its cooperation 
with the Council. He had been told that that even the president had accepted this new 
approach. Pietinen had answered that he was not aware of any change and believed that 
the discussion the parliamentarian was referring to had been held in the Parliament.144 
In his letter to the Risto Hyvärinen, Pietinen wrote that, in his opinion, the timing for a 
change in this policy might not be the best one since the EEC question was topical. He 
saw that “using a part of our trust supply” was not good idea especially because the 
profits would not be equivalent to the troubles accession would cause.145  
As discussed in the earlier chapter, the Parliament was made an active party in the CoE 
discussion in the middle of the 1970s. If until then, the main argument for non-
membership was the CoE’s position in the super power conflict, in the new policy it 
was succeeded by the requirement for a unanimous Parliament. This demand is, 
however, at odds with the president’s role as the leader of foreign policy. As 
Kallenautio points out, in the 1970s foreign policy was strictly led by Kekkonen himself 
and the successes of the early 1970s strengthened his grip on decision-making. Also, 
excluding some discordant notes, the president’s way of operating was generally 
approved by parliamentarians and leading politicians.146 Why would the Parliaments 
assent be needed for membership? I argue that it was merely an easy excuse for the FM 
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to use to whenever it was questioned by the CoE’s officials about Finland’s pessimistic 
view on membership. The argument for the need of parliament to unanimous persisted 
until the eve of the Finland’s membership.147   
                                                 
147 For example in August 1987 it is mentioned that the left but also the National Coalition Party is 
hesitant about membership.  UMA. 13-0-EN-db. 1982/931. Suomi Euroopan neuvostossa. Muistio 692. 
Eduskunnan toivomusaloite 55/14.4.1987 (Melin, ym.) Selvityksen tekeminen Euroopan neuvoston 
jäsenyyden anomiseksi. 17.8.1987. 
44 
 
4. Relations became more complex in the 1980s 
The cooperation between the Council and Finland had not progressed considerably 
during the 1970s. However, in the 1980 the development of the relations intensified 
again. As had happened during the Cold War in general, the interest towards the 
Council varied in the FM during the 1980s. In the beginning of the decade, the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs Paavo Väyrynen spoke very positively about the possibility to 
intensify relations with the Council, and I argue that Finland came close to establishing 
official contacts with it either in the form of membership or as an observer. From the 
middle of the decade on, the Council’s relations with the CEEC started to evolve and 
this development was closely followed by the FM. I claim that this was the main reason 
for the Finnish accession in 1989; Finland had to accede before the Eastern European 
countries formed too close relations with the CoE.  
Something worth mentioning here is the appearance of human rights in the FM’s 
discussion in the late 1980s. The Council was and is, first and foremost, an organisation 
that aims to promote and strengthen human rights. Considering the importance of the 
CoE’s human rights work and their primary role in the its actions, it is surprising that in 
the FM this aspect was not brought up until the middle of the 1980s, and quite seldom 
even then. When human rights were on the FM’s agenda, they were mentioned only as a 
part of the Council work and, for example, the state of human rights in Finland or how 
Finland could contribute to CoE’s human rights work was not discussed. The 
appearance of human rights in the discussion can be explained by Gorbachev’s new 
policy and vision for the future of Europe, the Common European Home. This concept 
introduced human rights as one significant element on which pan-European integration 
and international relations would be built. That human rights were not any longer a 
taboo for the USSR would ease both the CEEC’s and Finland’s efforts to deepen 
relations with the CoE.148 
                                                 
148 More on the concept of Common European Home, see for example: Savranskaya, Svetlana. “The Fall 
of the Wall, Eastern Europe, and Gorbachev’s New Vision of Europe after the Cold War” in Imposing, 
Maintaining and Tearing Open the Iron Curtain. The Cold War and East-Central Europe, 1945–1990. 
Ed. by Mark Kramer and Vít Smetama. Lexington Books. Maryland. 2014. 335–353. 336–340.; Rey, 
Marie-Pierre. ”’Europe is our Common Home’ A Study on Gorbachev’s Diplomatic Concept” in Cold 
War History, Vol 4, No 2 (January 2004). 33–65.; On the importance of the rule of law under Gorbachev 
see: Brown, Archie. Seven Years that Changed the World. Perestroika in Perspective. Oxford University 
Press. Oxford. 2007. For example: 22, 112, 142.  
45 
 
4.1. Relations in the beginning of the 1980s 
In the beginning of the 1980s, discussion in the FM about the Council and the 
possibility to increase cooperation with it turned positive and it seems that the FM was 
again prepared to consider accession.  
However, even before Väyrynen spoke for increasing cooperation, ambassadors brought 
up the need for Finland to accede to the Council. The first such a reference can be found 
from 1981 when Ensio Helaniemi from The Hague embassy suggested that Finland 
ought to join the organisation and referred to a meeting “from a few years ago” where 
Jorma Vanamo (ambassador in Stockholm from 1975 to 1980) had “once again” 
suggested the same.149 In 1982 Yrjö Väänänen from Copenhagen proposed that an 
exchange of views should be held concerning Finnish accession because, in his opinion, 
membership would strengthen the Finnish policy of neutrality.150  
Väyrynen’s changed perception started to take shape in June 1981 when he met with 
Secretary General Karasek.151 He still continued along traditional lines when he spoke 
of the reasons why Finland was not a member of the Council: it was already gaining 
everything there was to gain from the Council’s practical work and, therefore, accession 
was not considered necessary. Väyrynen also mentioned that from the FM’s side there 
were no obstacles for membership but the question had not been discussed in the 
Parliament recently and he insinuated that accession could be an option if the 
Parliament would agree on the question.152 
Väyrynen took the matter a step further in December 1981 during a meeting with the 
Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee (EUAV). Although Väyrynen stated that 
Finland was already getting all the benefits that the CoE had to offer, he, nevertheless, 
wished that the matter would be discussed in the Parliament, even if it might cause 
some disagreement among parliamentarians. Väyrynen told the EUAV that the FM did 
not consider there to be any obstacles for Finland’s accession and went on by stating 
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that, in fact, accession could be desirable. Therefore, if a common consent was found in 
the Parliament, accession could take place. 153 
However, the committee’s reaction was moderate: the chairperson Kalevi Sorsa stated 
that the final decision would be taken by the president. By saying this, I presume, he 
wanted to point out president Koivisto’s negative, or indifferent, stance on the Council 
and, also, that the Parliament was not the body that would make decisions in foreign 
policy questions; no matter what the FM wanted to tell the CoE. However, this was the 
first time that a Minister spoke for the possibility of accession. The meeting concluded 
that a memorandum on the Council would be drafted for the EUAV so that it could 
continue to work on the subject.154  
The parties continued the discussion in June 1982, and even though the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs had changed and Pär Stenbäck held the position, the positive attitude 
towards increased cooperation continued. The meetings memorandum, “Suomi ja 
Euroopan neuvosto: suhteiden kehittämisen vaihtoehdot”, concluded that research on 
the possible ways to organise relations with the Council should be continued, a 
committee to control the actions of different ministries should be established and that 
after the parliamentary elections of 1983 Karasek could be invited to Finland. The 
memorandum also stated that the question on different options on how to arrange 
relations with the CoE could be brought up more concretely in 1983.155 
However, according to my material, no such close consultation took place, nor did 
Karasek visit Finland.156 Explanation for why these plans were abandoned can be found 
from Stenbäck’s letter that was addressed to all Finnish embassies in January 1983. The 
letter underlined that Finland had to do whatever it took to convince the foreign powers 
in the East as well as in the West that the Finnish foreign policy would remain the same 
as it had been during Kekkonen’s time. Therefore, for the time being, the FM and the 
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president had come to a conclusion that the question for accession would not be brought 
up in the near future.157   
So, the increased interest towards the Council was only momentary and a change back 
towards the old attitude began already in 1983. In a meeting with PACE’s president 
Karl Ahrens in September 1984 Väyrynen, who had again been appointed as the 
Foreign Minister, still mentioned how pleased the Parliament was with its relations with 
PACE and that Finland would be willing to increase this cooperation. When Väyrynen 
brought up the reasons why Finland had not joined the Council, he said that Finland had 
concentrated on the CSCE process and that accession was first and foremost a 
parliamentary matter. However, what really indicated a change back towards the old 
attitude was how he described the CoE to be an embodiment of the division in 
Europe.158 This had not been used as a reason for non-membership nor had the Council 
been described that way since the new policy was formulated in 1976 and this position 
was deemed outdated. 
Another factor that had an effect on this change was the USSR’s tightening position 
towards the CoE. The Soviet attitude about Finland’s cooperation with the Council 
became clear in early 1986 when the Soviet ambassador Vladimir Sobolev informed 
Väyrynen about the USSR’s position. Sobolev argued that the composition of the CoE, 
as three fourths of the members were also NATO states, guided the Council’s decisions 
towards policy lines that NATO had adopted. According to Sobolev, this meant that the 
decisions taken in the Council were directed against the USSR and the socialist 
countries. Therefore the USSR regarded that if Finland wished to be able to continue to 
exercise its policy of neutrality and have normal relations with both the East and the 
West, it needed to stay outside the organisation. In the Soviet point of view, 
membership would bind Finland too closely to the West and its ideals.159  
Väyrynen’s answer to Sobolev was interesting. He said that as he has stated to Soviet 
parties before, Finland’s membership in the Council was not topical at the moment even 
though the press has speculated on the matter. He tried to affirm Sobolev that Finland 
was pleased with the current situation and was not considering to accede. However, due 
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to the fact that Finland was the only nonsocialist country that had not joined the CoE, 
Väyrynen stated that it was quite probable that accession would be brought up and 
discussed at some point in the future.160 Even though there is not any documents on 
earlier discussions with the Soviets about the Finnish cooperation with the Council, 
Väyrynen’s answer indicates that he has had to explain the Finnish position to a Soviet 
party also prior to this meeting. And, as Väyrynen brings up in one his books, this was 
indeed the case: he had met Soviet diplomat Juri Derjabin already in September 1983 
and during this meeting Derjabin commented on Finland’s membership in the Council 
and mentioned that for the USSR Finnish membership would be problematic.161 
Although Sobolev’s meeting with Väyrynen took place after the Finnish position had 
already changed, the FM was aware of the Soviet attitude years before this meeting.   
Why did the USSR react also in 1986 after the Finnish position had already changed? I 
argue that the timing of the reaction derived from activities in Finland’s relations with 
other Western organisations. Finland had participated in the first meeting of the Eureka 
project in 1985 and in 1986 it became a full member of EFTA.162 It is possible that the 
USSR thought that participation in various European organisations in such a short 
period of time would direct Finland too much towards the West and therefore, it wanted 
to remind the FM on its attitude towards the CoE.163  
What sparked such a turn to take place in the FM’s attitude in the beginning of the 
1980s altogether? The super power relations had taken a turn for worse in the late 1970s 
and, therefore, it seems peculiar that the FM considered that increasing cooperation with 
the CoE would be something worth opting for. Also, president Kekkonen had just 
stepped down and Koivisto was only asserting his authority as president. From the very 
beginning of his presidency Koivisto emphasised his vocation to continue on the path 
that Paasikivi and Kekkonen had laid for Finland and its foreign policy. This policy was 
based on stability and membership in the Council did not represent such stability.  
The Council adopted its first medium term plan in 1980 which proposed that the CoE’s 
political role should be increased or it would be side-lined by the EEC. This idea gained 
ground inside the CoE and the Swiss were especially eager to promote this line of 
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thinking.164 It is possible that the potential increase in the Council’s political role was of 
interest for the FM. 
In addition, Finland had signed the free trade agreement with the EEC in 1973 which 
had resolved Finland’s position in economic integration for the time being and, as 
researchers have pointed out, there was virtually no public or political debate on 
Finland’s relations with the EEC or even EFTA during the 1970s or early 1980s. The 
question of EFTA membership would become topical in 1984 and negotiations for the 
European Economic Area would begin only in 1989.165 I argue that as the most 
important question, the economy, had been resolved the FM deemed that was time to 
consider closer cooperation with the Council. 
4.2. CoE’s part in the cooperation 
During the first half of the 1980s, the Council continued on the path that it had adopted 
in the 1970s and did not pay much attention to Finland. In the second half of the 1980s 
this changed and the Council restarted its inquiries about the Finnish position and 
attitude towards itself. Starting from 1987 these inquiries became more and more 
common and straightforward because the Council was eager to extend its influence over 
Finland. 
In the 1980s, the CEN became active again: it expressed a wish to hold its meeting in 
Finland in 1983, 1985, 1987 and 1988. In all four occasions, the FM took a negative 
stance on these visits because, as it argued, it did not want the Committee to conduct a 
study on Finland and the Committee’s visit could have been interpreted as if 
membership in the Council was topical in the FM. 166  
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In 1983 and 1988 the FM refused the Committee’s meetings almost without discussing 
the issue; it stated briefly that the timing was not deemed suitable for such a visit.167 In 
1985 and 1987, however, even though the FM did not want the CEN to meet in Finland 
it could not just forbid it from coming. In 1985 the Paris embassy remarked that if the 
FM would prevent the committee’s meeting, this would negatively affect the image that 
Finland had created for itself in the Council and the discussion on Finlandisation could 
break out inside the CoE and perhaps in wider circles too. It suggested that the FM 
should not be in any contact with the CEN.168  
In 1987, it was the embassy in Stockholm that weighted the positive and negative 
effects that the visit might bring on. If the FM turned the Committee down, then at least 
the Swedish representatives who had suggested the visit, would start to wonder which 
the real reasons behind the negative answer were. However, if the Committee was 
invited to Finland, then, the press as well as the public would start to wonder the 
reasons for this.169 The FM concluded in March 1987 that the visit should be stopped 
because it could either be interpreted to signal that preparations for accession had 
started or that Finland was under a same kind of investigation that the Eastern European 
countries had sometimes been. Neither of these scenarios pleased the FM and especially 
any implication of change in Finland’s foreign policy so close to the upcoming 
Parliamentary elections was not welcomed.170  
The difference in the reactions to the CEN’s proposition reflects the differing attitude 
that the FM had towards the Council during the 1980s: In 1983 ideas of closer 
cooperation were just abandoned and in 1988 the question would be resolved entirely 
quite soon; in 1985 and 1987 the relations with the CoE had not been settled but 
remained open and, thus activity from the CoE’s side was not deemed beneficial. Also, 
this shows how sensitive an issue any sign of increased cooperation still was in 1985 
and also in 1987.  
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In 1987, the Council had noticed that it had received quite a significant amount of 
attention in the Finnish press. This had an influence on the CoE’s actions and from the 
second half of 1987 on the Council’s officials were very straightforward in their 
discussions with the FM: they would like to see Finland to accede. This became 
apparent in October 1987 when several Council officials, the Head of the Secretary 
General’s Private office Bruno Haller included, expressed this wish to Minister 
Counsellor Charles Murto.171 Again in February 1988, in the same meeting where he 
requested if the CEN could meet in Finland, the Committee’s president Peter Sager told 
Richard Tötterman that he would like to see Finland to become a member. Finland’s 
membership would increase the CoE’s importance towards the EC and the Eastern 
European countries that had shown growing interest towards the Council.172 
After the FM had informed the Council about its wish to accede, Secretary General 
Oreja told Murto that he had never wanted to rush Finland into membership and had 
understood that Finland should be left in peace to make this decision. Now that Finland 
had decided to join, Oreja wanted to grant it as much time as necessary for the accession 
preparations. However, under this seeming modesty, the same eagerness to get Finland 
to accede that had been evident throughout the years became apparent in Oreja’s words: 
he had already planned the schedule of Finnish accession.173 
4.3. Cooperation between the CEEC and the CoE intensifies  
As the connections between the Council and the CEEC grew during the latter part of the 
decade, so did the amount of attention the matter received in the FM. This growing 
interests towards the CoE’s relation with the East can be seen already from the amount 
of material that the FM’s archives hold: from earlier decades, material concerning the 
CoE’s cooperation with the East can be found among everything else but for years 
1986–1987 this material has been collected in a separate folder. The importance of the 
question on the possibility of closer cooperation between the CoE and the East is 
                                                 
171 UMA. 13-0-EN-ba. 1982/4513. Euroopan neuvosto/yleistä. Seppo Pietinen. Kirje 368. Euroopan 
neuvosto; ajankohtaisia kysymyksiä. 7.10.1987. Attachement: P.M. Ministerineuvos Charles Murron 
keskustelut Strasbourgissa 28.–30.9.1987 Euroopan neuvostoon liittyvistä kysymyksistä.; UMA. 13-0-
EN-bd. 1982/931. Suomi Euroopan neuvostossa v. 1987.  Cuttings. 
172 UMA. Tötterman. 17.2.1988. 
173 UMA. 32.00. EN. 1988/5762. EN / Suomen jäsenyys 1988 I (1.1.–30.4). Kirje: PARB036. 
Ulkoministeri Sorsan käynti Euroopan neuvostossa = Pääsihteeri Orejan ja EN:n sihteeristön käsityksiä 
Suomen liittymisaikataulusta ja neuvotteluista. 28.4.1988. 
52 
 
portrayed not only in the amount of material but also by the fact that often the records 
and documents were distributed to the president and Prime Minister as well. 
The Council had begun to build closer cooperation with the CEEC in 1984 but it took 
some time for these plans to become reality. Prior to March 1987 there had been quite a 
lot of talk on furthering relations with the East but actual contacts had remained almost 
non-existent. This changed when PACE’s representatives174 met with the CSCE 
ambassadors of Romania, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Poland, DDR, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia and the USSR in Vienna on the 12th of March 1987.175 For many 
participating countries this was the first semi-official contact with the CoE.   
The FM was informed about the meeting in May, two months after it had been held, 
when Finland’s embassy in Paris received the meeting’s documents from a Nordic 
contact and they were thoroughly studied in the FM. Although the main focus of the 
rendezvous was placed on the CSCE process, the CoE received some attention too and 
many countries commented especially the Resolution 866(1986).  The Yugoslavian and 
Romanian representatives had asked to meet in private but the rest of the Eastern 
European countries participated in a joint meeting. Even though the USSR’s 
representative was present, the other countries were willing to express their wishes to 
increase cooperation with the CoE or at least stated their views about the organisation. 
The USSR’s representatives did not make any comments on the Council.176 
The Council’s representatives wanted to find out if the Eastern European countries 
would be willing to establish official contacts with the CoE and emphasised that such 
ties would be the first step in the creation of a new European society.177 Not 
surprisingly, the countries that were already planning to establish official contacts with 
the CoE by, for example, inviting the Secretary General for a visit, were the most eager 
to express their opinions on the CoE and its recent efforts to build deeper cooperation. 
Of the individual countries’ reactions the Hungarian and Romanian opinions are of the 
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most interest for this research.178 These two countries were the most willing to form 
relations with the Council, and their development was closely followed in the FM in 
1987.  
The Romanian delegation stated that they had been very pleased with the contacts that 
had formed between PACE and Romania, and pointed out that dialogue had been 
opened in November 1986.179 The Resolution 866 was also brought up when a CoE’s 
representative referred to its paragraph 37180 and wanted to know if Romanians thought 
that official connections could be established between the CoE and the Eastern 
countries. The Romanian delegation answered that they could not speak on behalf of all 
the socialist countries but that they agreed with the paragraph’s ambitions even though 
they wished to see this development take place outside the blocs.181 
In its statement, Hungary wished to differentiate itself from the rest of the socialist 
countries because “each country had its own specific features conditioned by history 
and its geographical situation”, and said to only be talking for itself. They were pleased 
that the situation between the East and the Council had become clearer and that contacts 
had been established in the political level.182 Hungary was studying the CoE’s proposals 
but it could not accept some of the expressions that the Resolution 866 contained, 
particularly in relation to Eastern European countries, and emphasised that the Council 
should adopt a realistic approach towards the East.183 
In many instances before and after the meeting, the CoE’s officials emphasised its 
importance for the future development of the East-West relations and hoped that further 
contacts would follow. Maybe the most enthusiastic comment was made by Austrian 
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PACE member when he stated that “The meeting - - - constituted an unprecedented 
recognition of the existence of the Council of Europe.”184 Even if this enthusiasm might 
have been overly optimistic, the importance here lies in how it might have affected the 
FM’s view on the CoE-East relations. The meeting took place simultaneously with the 
Romanian initiative to invite PACE’s president to Bucharest and the Hungarian 
invitation to the Secretary General Oreja to Budapest.185  
The meeting’s final conclusions were that cooperation between the East and the Council 
should be extended to concern various fields of action and that neither military 
questions nor human rights problems should be used as means to block the 
development.186 Put together these developments showed that the relations between the 
CoE and the East would indeed intensify; and Finland could no longer observe the 
Council from a distance. 
The FM had gained information on the possibility that the Warsaw Pact's attitude 
towards the Council was changing even before it knew that the meeting had been held. 
The first time that Finnish officials heard about this possibility took place already in 
August 1986 when Guyla Horn, Secretary of State of the Hungary’s Foreign Ministry, 
was in Finland. During his visit, the FM learned that it was likely that Hungary had 
already established contacts with the CoE on a semi-official level and that a group of 
Hungarian, Polish and Soviet representatives was preparing Horn’s visit to the 
Council.187 Minister Counsellor Henry Söderholm from the Paris embassy was sent to 
Strasbourg to find out if these contacts had indeed been established. The Council did not 
bring up anything that would either confirm or contradict the FM’s information and 
because Söderholm was not allowed to bring the question up directly, the trip did not 
cast any light on the matter.188 Therefore speculation on the possible rapprochement 
continued during the year and nothing was affirmed until the aforementioned meeting. 
The FM received the first direct evidence of Hungary’s growing interest immediately 
after the CoE-East Europe meeting. The Hungarian embassy had sent Councillor Tick to 
the FM to acquire information on Finland’s relations with the CoE and how these 
                                                 
184 Ibid. p. 15, 16 & Ibid. Attachment to letter: Draft minutes of the Political Affairs Committee’s meeting 
held in Paris 25.3.1987. 3. 
185 Ibid. Attachment to letter: Draft minutes of the Political Affairs Committee’s meeting held in Paris 
25.3.1987. 3. 
186 Ibid. 17. 
187 Ibid. Sähke 309. Euroopan neuvoston ja Varsovan liiton maiden suhteet. 28.8.1986.  
188 Ibid. Henry Söderholm. Sanoma 576, Asia: EN/Varsovan liiton maat. 25.9.1986. 
55 
 
relations had been organised. When asked, Tick told that the recent changes that had 
taken place in Europe had made it possible for Hungary to start thinking about closer 
cooperation with the Council. However, as Tick pointed out, Hungary deemed that quite 
a few reservations regarding closer cooperation still existed and it viewed some aspects 
of the Council’s work in a negative light. 189 
The tightening relationship between the CoE and Hungary raised interest in the FM and 
during the summer 1987 the Finnish ambassador in Hungary, Arto Mansala, kept the 
FM informed about this development and especially about Oreja’s visit to Budapest.190 
This visit, during which Oreja met with Horn and representatives of the Hungarian 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, accelerated the development and steps to further the 
relations were agreed on: in the following October a delegation would travel to 
Strasbourg to discuss possible forms of cooperation and after that Hungary would study 
the CoE’s conventions and decide to which it would accede.191  
Even though Mansala and the FM thought that it was clear that Hungary’s target was 
not membership,192 the speed in which the relations started to develop and the fact that 
other Warsaw Pact countries were following this development closely was noted in the 
FM.  
Poland was also interested in creating closer ties with the CoE and it followed 
Hungarian actions closely. The Polish attitude became clear in May 1987 when 
Wojciech Jaruzelski, the First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party, caused 
amazement among Western leaders by stating that the Council should be given a Pan-
European dimension. The Finnish embassy in Warsaw was, however, certain that this 
would a long-term-target.193 In addition, Oreja was invited to visit Warsaw where he 
travelled in March 1988.194 
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In the same way as the Hungarians, the Romanians too wanted to learn how Finland had 
organised its relations with the Council and they consulted the Finnish embassy in 
Bukarest in June 6, 1987. The Romanians informed the FM that they were interested to 
learn more about Finland’s cooperation with the CoE because they were planning on 
starting to build closer ties with it. This cooperation would be established little by little 
and would start by the Romanians acquainting themselves with the CoE’s 
conventions.195  
The Romanian national Assembly had established connections with the Council in 
November 1986 and a visit of the CEN to Romania took place in April 1987.196 
Although the cooperation between the Council and Romania was one of the earliest to 
start, it did not yield similar results as the Hungarian or Polish initiatives. Even so, this 
development was also be noted in Finland and would influence the overall picture it had 
on the relationship between the CoE and the East.  
In addition to Hungarian, Polish and Romanian growing interests, the FM learned in 
December 1987 that also the USSR had shown interest towards creating cooperation 
with the Council on the parliamentary level and that the Chairman of the Soviet of the 
Union Lev Tolkunov and a delegation of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union were 
to visit PACE in January 1988.197 Only a few days later, the embassy in Hungary 
concluded that Poland, and to some extent the USSR, were interested in starting 
cooperation with the CoE.198  
Furthermore, Murto learned during his discussions with the CoE’s officials and 
Sweden’s Permanent Representative’s substitute Rune Sjöberg in October 1987, that 
one of the most important topics of the Council of Minister’s 81st Session in November 
1987 would be the CoE’s East-West relations and that the CM was prepared to deepen 
the Council’s cooperation with the East also in other than purely technical questions. 
Also, Erik Leijon, the CM's Secretary on Communication with National Parliaments and 
the Public, told that the CM was eager to see that the neutral countries would act as the 
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mediators of this development.199 This was not the first time that this idea was brought 
up by the Council200  and it seems that one of the most important reasons that the 
Council had for getting Finland to join in the late 1980s was related to its efforts to 
establish relations with the East. Because Finland had close relations with the USSR, it 
would be an ideal actor to promote this cooperation. The importance of Finland’s role in 
the East-West cooperation was also brought up in PACE’s discussion about Finland’s 
membership application in February 1989. In the discussion almost all of the over 20 
speakers that addressed the meeting marked that the Finnish membership would have a 
positive effect on the rapprochement of the CoE and the East. A Norwegian member of 
PACE, Gunnar Skaug, went the furthest and suggested that now when Finland was 
about to accede “the Council of Europe can now really start to open the doors for 
contacts over the whole of Europe.”201   
All in all, the relations between the East and the CoE leaped forward in the last months 
of the 1987 and a memorandum on this development was drafted in the Ministry in late 
December.  Although it did not take a stance for or against membership, it provided the 
FM with a concrete view on how extensive the Council’s and the CEEC’s cooperation 
actually was and how quickly it had developed.202 Because the ambition to develop 
cooperation was widespread inside the CoE as well as among the CEEC, it was 
probable that the development of the relations would continue. The policy of neutrality 
and the image of Finland as a country that was an inherent part of the Western 
compilation of ideals on democracy and human rights would have suffered if an Eastern 
country had proceeded further than Finland in its relations with the Council. Therefore, 
I argue that the decision to apply for membership was greatly influenced by the 
possibility that one of the CEECs would proceed deeper in its relations with the CoE 
than Finland had done.  
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4.4. Towards accession 
In the second half of the 1980s, the FM realised that the CoE’s position in Europe was 
changing and that Finland was gradually losing the special status that it had enjoyed in 
the Council for decades. If Finland wanted to stay informed about the CoE’s actions and 
take part in its work, it needed to rearrange its relation with it.  
The appearance of human rights into the FM’s discussion took place in 1985 and was 
linked to the CEN’s wish to hold its meeting in Finland. The Committee had had on its 
agenda, for example, the general human rights situation in the USSR, slave work in 
Siberia and the situation of ethnical groups and minorities in the USSR.203 After the FM 
had learned this, it wanted to find out how often these questions were discussed in the 
Council. However, every time that Söderholm brought up the question during his visits 
to Strasbourg, the CoE’s officials assured him that the even though PACE discussed 
these questions quite regularly, parliamentarians could always leave dissenting opinions 
into the minutes. The official’s never mentioned if the question was debated in the 
CM.204 It seems that the Council’s officials were aware that the appearance of these 
questions in the Council would have a negative effect on Finland’s attitude towards it.   
After Sobolev had informed Väyrynen on the Soviet position in early 1986, the FM’s 
attitude towards accession remained reserved for a short time. However, from the 
second half of the 1986 on, the CEEC’s rapprochement with the Council started to 
materialise. This was noted in the FM as well, and soon the FM’s officials understood 
that this development would actually lead to closer relations between the East and the 
CoE. In addition, speculation about the CoE taking a more significant role as a 
coordinator of the EFTA-EC relations surfaced in the FM in 1986. 
As in the beginning of the decade, it was an ambassador who first brought up the need 
for Finland to join the Council. In 1986 Ossi Sunell, Finland’s ambassador to France, 
pointed out in his letter to Väyrynen, titled EUREKA, ESA – entä EN?205, that Finland 
had been able to arrange its relations with the two first mentioned organisations and the 
only question that remained to be resolved was the Council. Sunell considered it to be 
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his duty to suggest that a research on the possibility of accession should be started.206 
Again in September 1987, Sunell addressed the Ministry: in his opinion, the natural 
continuation of Finland’s increasing cooperation with the CoE would be membership. 
He argued that if Finland joined the CoE’s Human Rights Committee as an observer207, 
the excuse that the FM had used for not joining the Council – that even though there 
was not any political obstacles for accession, membership had not been deemed 
necessary in Finland – would lose the little credibility that it had thus far had.208   
In 1986, the FM encountered a new problem in its relationship with the Council. Until 
then, the Council had been willing to treat Finland as if it was more tightly intertwined 
in CoE’s work as it really was and, therefore, Finland had been able to take part in all of 
the CoE’s activities that it wished. However, when the FM wanted to partake in the 
Ministerial Conference on Combatting terrorism and the Pompidou group209, it was not 
granted access to neither of these bodies.  
Although the reason why the Council excluded Finland was sensible, none of the two 
were open to non-member countries, the Council’s decision caused dissatisfaction in the 
FM. In Sunell’s opinion, this proved that the CoE’s attitude towards Finland had 
changed.210 In January 1987, Seppo Pietinen who had been appointed to Paris in late 
1986, was sent to Strasbourg to resolve the matter. Although many of the CoE’s 
officials were favourable towards Finnish participation in these groups, the trip did not 
yield any concrete results.211 Pietinen reported back to Väyrynen that even though he 
was well received by the Council, he could not shed away the feeling that the non-
membership significantly diminished the credibility of the Finnish policy of neutrality 
in the West.212  
Another problem that Sunell had brought up already in January 1986, became concrete 
in the FM in late 1986: Finland could not receive enough information on the CM’s 
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work. The same issue had surfaced also in connection to the FM’s efforts to get 
information on the Council’s activities concerning human rights in the East. The FM 
approached the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to solve this problem, and in 
December it agreed to provide Finland with information on the Ministerial Conferences 
and the Council’s other political work. The old cautious attitude still persisted in the FM 
as the Stockholm embassy was instructed to emphasise to the Swedes that the only 
purpose of these inquiries was to stay informed about the Council’s work; Finland was 
not reformulating its policy about the Council.213  
The FM’s efforts to get information on the CM were not limited only to Sweden. 
During his visit in to the CoE in January 1987, Pietinen expressed the FM’s concern 
about these difficulties to the Council’s officials.214 As had been noted earlier in this 
thesis, the Council of Minister’s meetings are closed from the public as are the 
meetings’ documents and, therefore, no one had a satisfactory answer to the FM’s 
problem. The Finnish request to gain information on the CM can seem a bit exceptional 
due to its nature. However, the FM had multiple reasons to try to gain access to the 
material and find out what the CM had on its agenda; the increasing cooperation with 
the East and NATO’s possible influence on the Council’s decisions, to name some. The 
latter reason had been brought up by Sobolev a year earlier when he conveyed that the 
Council was strongly linked to NATO. It is possible that the FM was still trying to 
resolve if the CM’s NATO connection could be interpreted the way the USSR had done. 
If this question was resolved, the FM’s task to define its attitude towards the Council 
would have become easier. 
Another development that was likely to increase the level of interest the CoE received in 
the FM was brought up in the summer of 1986: the Council’s possible role in the EC-
EFTA cooperation.215 The incentive behind the Council’s increased role was the idea 
that some of the EC directives could be extended to apply to the CoE’s members as 
well. As Matti Kahiluoto, Director General of the Political Department, brought up in 
July 1987, if the plan would materialise, it would signify a significant increase in the 
CoE’s importance.216 However, this plan did not lead to any concrete results, and, thus, 
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it disappeared from the FM’s discussion before the decision to accede was made. 
Nevertheless, considering the priorities of Finland’s foreign policy, the possibility of the 
CoE adopting a more significant role in European economic cooperation was something 
that guaranteed that the Council would remain on the FM’s agenda. 
The Council received attention also in the Finnish media and among the business elite 
in 1987. The CoE became a talking point in May 1987 when Kari Kairamo, CEO of 
Nokia and the president of the Finnish Foreign Trade Association, spoke about the 
benefits that accession could bring to Finnish businesses. Kairamo’s speech triggered a 
discussion in the press on the Finnish position. This discussion was followed in the FM 
and it was interpreted to mean that the acceptance towards the Council had grown 
among the public.217   
In connection to other developments, the attention that the Council received in the 
media had an effect on the FM as well, and the Government’s Foreign Affairs 
Committee discussed accession on June 9th, 1987.218 For this meeting, Matti Kahiluoto 
had drafted a memorandum, which stated that the most significant problem that 
Finland’s non-membership has caused was linked to the negative effect that it had had 
on the image of Finland in the West. However, because a new government had just been 
formed, accession to the CoE could be interpreted as a change in the Finnish foreign 
policy. Therefore, it would be better to return to the question later on, perhaps after the 
presidential elections that would be held in February 1988.219 So even though the media 
and Finnish businesses thought positively about Finland’s membership, the FM decided 
to wait. This shows just how sensitive the membership question was considered to be in 
the FM and among the political elite.  
In his memoirs Koivisto tells that he agreed with Kahiluoto’s memorandum and did not 
want anything that could make the “harder” integration questions more difficult to 
solve, and, hence, the matter did not proceed.220 But what were those “hard” integration 
questions in 1987, and how were they solved six months later when Koivisto had 
changed his mind? Finland had joined EFTA as a full member in 1986 without any 
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significant objection from the USSR,221 questions concerning Eureka and the ESA had 
also been solved and the issue of the European Economic Area was not yet topical as 
Tarkka, among others, has argued.222 It seems that the presidential elections were given 
as an excuse to postpone accession until Finland could be absolutely sure that the 
USSR’s attitude towards the Council had changed. 
However, the question on how Finland would proceed was resolved before the 
presidential elections were held. In January 1988 Koivisto told the press in an electoral 
debate that there were no obstacles for the Finnish membership in the CoE and that the 
government would discuss the question “in a non-distant future”.223 The FM did not 
waste time after Koivisto’s statement and in February it had drafted a memorandum on 
the CoE, its organisation and Finnish participation in its work, which, as the 
memorandum states, was extensive. In 1987, every Ministry, except the Ministry of 
Defense and the Ministry of Trade and Industry, had sent participants to the CoE’s 
meetings and the total amount of conventions that Finland had singed amounted to nine. 
The memorandum noted that since the question of membership was last discussed in the 
HUAV in June 1987, the Council’s relations with the East have advanced further and 
the Council had decided to treat every Eastern European country separately.224 The 
latter statement is significant because it means that the FM had realised that CoE did not 
consider the East to form a single bloc anymore but that each country would be judged 
by its own special characters. This meant that relations between the CoE and a single 
Eastern country could develop quickly. 
On the 8th of April Matti Kahiluoto drafted a memorandum which suggested that 
Finland should start accession negotiations. The arguments that were used in the 
memorandum to support the accession are manifold. The possibility to advance 
European cooperation in other fields that the economy and with more participants than 
just the EEC or EFTA countries were brought up. Full membership was considered to 
be advisable because it would provide Finland with the possibility to influence the 
Council’s development and take part in all aspects of its work. Interestingly, the 
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argument on Finland’s policy of neutrality that had been used to support non-
membership was turned around: the memorandum insisted that if Finland remained 
outside the Council and its human rights work, this could continue to raise questions 
and harm the image of Finland in the West. In addition, the CoE’s work to advance 
connections between the East and the West was given as a reason to support accession: 
because this work had borne fruit and both sides had altered their attitude, support for 
accession had grown in Finland as well. 225   
However, the memorandum did not contain anything about the Parliament as it only 
cursorily mentioned that the support for accession had grown in Finland.226 As has been 
previously discussed, the Parliament’s unanimity became a prerequisite for accession in 
1976 when the FM redefined its policy towards the CoE. During the 1980s the disunited 
Parliament was still often used as an excuse for the Finnish non-membership.227  
Before the decision to join the Council was made, the FM did consult the Parliament to 
find out if the support for membership had grown. In August 1987, Jaakko Hissa told 
the FM that the interest towards the CoE had increased among Parliamentarians but that 
the attitude of the far-left had not changed and that some members of the Coalition party 
were also still hesitant.228 However, the interest in the Parliament had in general grown 
and this led to parliamentarians submitting two petitionary motions on the subject in the 
late 1980s. The first one was submitted in April 1987 by Ingvar S. Melin and the second 
as late as in February 1988 by Ilkka-Christian Björklund.229  
So, in the end, the Parliament did not have to be unanimous. It was enough that the 
president and the FM were of the opinion that it was time for Finland to join the Council 
and that the majority of the parliamentarians accepted the membership. The lack of 
unanimity became evident when the Parliament voted on the membership on April 18, 
1989: in addition to the parliamentarians of the Democratic Alternative230 voting against 
accession, 74 parliamentarians were not present in the session during the vote. This also 
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shows how strong the suspicion against western organisations was and how careful 
parliamentarians were in regards to questions that could have caused the USSR to react 
negatively.231  
Another topic that you would expect to have risen to the fore when membership was 
discussed was human rights. However, this was not the case. In February when the 
FM’s Political and Juridical Departments drafted memorandums on the Council these 
documents only noted that human rights were considered to be the core of the Council’s 
work.232 The memorandum drafted in April mentioned that until then Finland could not 
have participated in the Council’s human rights activities but they were not included in 
the reasons why Finland should accede.233 In addition, as Kallenautio has bought up, in 
the preliminary debate on membership in the Parliament the Prime Minister Harri 
Holkeri used mainly economic issues as arguments to support the membership. This is 
not directly related to the discussion in the FM but offers us a further example on how 
little attention the government gave to human rights questions.234 
It is interesting to note that in the Finnish case, the Council’s efforts to promote human 
rights were in fact a more important argument for the decision to not to join the Council 
than the other way around. During the Cold War, PACE took an active interest in the 
CEEC’s human rights situation and until the middle of the 1980s it conducted extensive 
studies on the subject. During these years, it released multiple reports on the human 
rights situation and how these rights were violated in the USSR and other communist 
states.235 Because PACE’s meetings and documents were accessible to everyone, the 
Soviet Union was aware of this criticism. For Finland, who did not want to interfere in 
the USSR’s internal matters, this was quite inconvenient. 
The decisions that Finland would accede to the Council and Oreja would be invited to 
Finland were finally made on the 21st of April 1988 in the Government’s Foreign 
Affairs Committee and the decision was based on the two aforementioned 
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memorandums.236 As if by chance, this meeting was held a day after a USSR delegation 
visited PACE.237  
The schedule for accession was drafted already in the last days of April by Oreja who 
suggested that Finland could accede on May 5, 1989, which was also the 50th 
anniversary of the Council.238 The Council approved Finland’s membership request 
unanimously and Finland joined the Council in May 1989, only a few months before 
Hungary. Finland had finally joined the organisation that would soon to be anything but 
a sleeping beauty in the banks of the Rhine.239 
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5. Conclusions 
This thesis studies the development of cooperation between Finland and the Council of 
Europe during the Cold War as it is portrayed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs’ 
internal documents during the time period. Because no previous study about the 
development of these relations has been conducted, one important aim of this thesis is to 
draw an overall picture of how the concrete cooperation between the two parties 
developed. Furthermore, the policies that aimed at determining the basis for the 
development of cooperation, as well as the issues that had an effect on the definition of 
these policies are examined in this study. In addition, the arguments that were used in 
the FM’s documents for and against deeper cooperation with the CoE have been of 
interest to this thesis. 
After Switzerland acceded the Council in 1963 Finland became the last neutral country 
unaffiliated with the CoE, as well as the only European country that fulfilled the 
membership requirements. The Council took interest in Finland’s stance and was eager 
to see it accede. This attention forced the FM to formulate a policy towards the Council 
and in 1963 the “Käytännöllisen yhteistyön linja” was adopted, which would define the 
FM’s approach towards the CoE for the next ten years. According to the policy, the 
Council was an embodiment of the division of the continent and a potential source of 
disagreements between the two blocs; therefore close relations with the Council were 
not believed to correspond with the Finnish policy of neutrality. 
In 1976, the ”Käytännöllisen yhteistyön linja” was redefined. The redefinition took 
place because in the 1970s the CoE had begun to question the FM’s excuses for non-
membership. After studying the matter, the FM deemed that relations with the Council 
could no longer be based on the argument that cooperation with the Council would be 
problematic for the policy of neutrality and, therefore, this approach was abandoned. 
Although the FM concluded that membership would not be impossible, it was still not 
prepared to have Finland join the Council as a full member or even as an observer 
country. In the policy the new reason for Finland’s non-membership was defined to be 
the Parliament’s unanimity, which was set as the condition for membership. Thus, the 
disunited Parliament remained the main argument that the FM’s officials used when 
they had do to defend the Finnish negative attitude towards the Council until the 
decision to seek membership was made in 1988. 
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The next controlled reformulation of the FM’s policy took place in 1988 when the 
decision to accede was made. However, in the early 1980s interest towards the Council 
had started to grow and I argue that the FM was preparing to establish official contacts 
with the Council already in the first half of the decade. However, due to Kekkonen’s 
retirement the principal policy guideline of the Finnish foreign policy would be to 
ensure its continuity and in early 1983 the FM and the president decided that 
development of Finland’s relations with the Council would be put on hold. The fact that 
EFTA membership became topical in 1984 also affected the momentary lack of interest 
in the Council. However, interest towards the Council picked up pace again in 1987 as 
the level of cooperation between the East and the CoE started to increase in the latter 
half of 1987; the FM had to rethink its attitude towards the Council in order to maintain 
the image of Finland’s neutrality. The idea that a Communist country would proceed 
further in its relations with the Council was not accepted in the FM and the decision to 
join the Council was made in April 1988.  
Although the FM’s interest towards the Council fluctuated during the Cold War years, 
the development of concrete cooperation was never fully on hold. Over the years 
Finnish representatives took part in the CoE’s technical work, participated in its 
committees and the FM signed some its conventions. The signing of the conventions is 
a good example of the attitude that the FM had towards the CoE: In addition to granting 
Finland access to the Council’s work, they provided Finland with additional benefits 
and, for example, facilitated Finland’s participation in the Nordic cooperation.  
Earlier studies have brought forward that the Council put pressure on the FM and, thus, 
tried to guide it towards full membership from the late 1987 on. This thesis has 
demonstrated that the CoE in fact took interest in Finland throughout the Cold War and 
aimed at convincing it to accede. The amount of attention that the Council gave to 
Finland fluctuated during the decades but it was, nevertheless, continuous. That the 
FM's adopted policies towards the Council were mostly successful from the Finnish 
point of view was largely due to the Council's receptive attitude. Up until the second 
half of the 1980s, the CoE was willing to grant access to all of its work that the FM 
deemed beneficial without placing significant pressure on it. Therefore, the FM was 
able to exercise its pick-and-choose policies for many years. However, in the second 
half of the 1980s, the CoE's attitude began to change. In practice this meant that the FM 
was denied access to some bodies it had wanted to take part in. Also, at the same time, 
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the FM faced difficulties when it tried to access information on the Council of 
Ministers’ meeting’s agendas and decisions. In the FM, this was interpreted to mean 
that the special relationship that had existed between it and the CoE was coming to an 
end, and it might have to reformulate its policy in response. 
For the most time relations with the Council of Europe were of secondary importance 
for the Finnish decision-makers and Finland’s foreign policy aims. However, this thesis 
has pointed out that the CoE’s work was closely followed in the FM and that its interest 
towards the Council varied during the Cold War: on the one hand Finland was close to 
joining the Council in 1967 and 1982 and on the other hand in the 1970s interest in the 
Council diminished. This changing level of interest in the Council was related to 
developments that took place in the Cold War climate and the shifts of focus in the 
Finnish foreign policy.  
In general, it can be argued that when the “harder” integration questions, i.e. economy, 
had been solved for the time being, more attention was given to the Council in the FM. 
This was the context for the increased interest in 1967 as well as in the beginning of the 
1980s. In early 1970s, economic issues were of the utmost importance for the FM as it 
had to rearrange its relations with the EEC and, as a consequence, with the USSR as 
well. In addition, as the FM considered the CSCE process to be the primary forum to 
promote East-West rapprochement in Europe and, therefore, it was deemed that the 
Council would not bring anything new to the table, interest in the Council diminished 
during the 1970s. 
Another important factor that affected the FM’s attitude and made it very cautious about 
the way cooperation with the CoE was conducted, was Soviet attitude towards the 
Council. For the USSR the CoE was an embodiment of the West and its values and the 
fact that most of its members were also NATO countries only increased the level of 
suspicion that it felt towards the Council. In addition, that the Council was active in 
human rights questions and pointed out human rights violations that took place in the 
East had a negative effect on the USSR’s attitude towards the CoE. The FM attempted 
to convince their Soviet counterparts that its cooperation with the CoE did not indicate a 
change in the undertone of its foreign policy and, therefore, close official contacts, i.e. 
membership or official observer status, with the Council were considered impossible in 
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the FM. As long as the Soviet attitude towards the Council remained openly negative, 
Finland did not have a real possibility to seek membership. 
Simultaneously, the FM tried to hide from the Council the fact that the Soviet negative 
stance was one of the key defining factors of its attitude. However, it was not successful 
in this and consequently the Council officials were eager inform the FM whenever the 
Council’s relations with the East had taken a step further, no matter how small the step 
was, because they knew that these relations were of interest to the FM. 
Accordingly, Finland’s decision to accede was also influenced by the Soviet Union, if 
not directly then via its satellites. The Council had tried to establish connections with 
the Communist Eastern European Countries since the 1960s and they had indeed taken 
part in some areas of the CoE’s work. However, the breakthrough in these relations took 
place as late as in 1987, when Hungary, Poland and Romania made their interest in the 
CoE clear. This development was closely followed in Finland. I claim that the decision 
made in 1988 to seek membership in the Council was heavily influenced by the rapidly 
developing relations between the Council and Hungary and Poland. Furthermore, I 
argue, that the Finland had little choice but to accede in 1989. If it had not done so, it 
would soon have found itself in a situation where a communist country had proceeded 
further in its cooperation with the Council. If this had happened, the policy of neutrality 
would have lost all of its credibility in the Council’s member states.  
Finland’s membership and non-membership in the Council were highly political issues 
at their time and were tightly intertwined with Finland’s foreign policy, the policy of 
neutrality and developments within them. Since the early years of the 1960s, it was 
evident that neither membership nor complete absence from the Council’s activities 
were viable options. Total lack of cooperation with the CoE was deemed impossible due 
to the effect that it would have had on the credibility of Finland’s policy of neutrality in 
the West. In addition, stagnation in these relations could affect the discussion on 
Finlandisation, and the FM wanted to avoid this. However, the FM had to carefully 
consider in which parts of the CoE’s work it could take part without this causing 
disagreements with the USSR; this was already one of the main elements of the 
“Käytännöllisen yhteistyön linja” 
This thesis has demonstrated that Finland’s relationship with the Council of Europe 
during the Cold War was more complex than previous research has presented it to be 
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and that connections between the Council and Finland were much more manifold that 
has been previously thought. The aim of this thesis has not been to debunk earlier 
research but to cast more light on Finland’s relationship with the Council and to offer a 
broader background for Finland’s membership. 
I can conclude that it would be wrong to claim that Finland’s late accession to the 
Council was due to a lack of interest towards it in the FM. It is accurate to state that the 
Council was never considered to be of great importance in the FM but it did however 
attract interest during the research period and on several occasions the issue of seeking 
membership was seriously considered only to be then abandoned due to changes in 
circumstances. 
There are still questions that remain to be answered about Finland’s relationship with 
the Council. Now that the FM’s archive material has been studied, the next phase in 
deepening our understanding of the development of the Finnish relations with the 
Council would be to interview politicians and the FM’s officials that worked with the 
issue. This could cast more light on, for example, the question of why the interest 
towards the Council grew in the beginning of the 1980s. Furthermore, the finer details 
of the Council’s point of view remain to be unravelled. What motivated it to pressure 
Finland to join it during the years of the Cold War? The Council’s archives and 
interviews with the Council’s officials will offer a good basis for further study. 
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